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Executive Summary
Context and rationale of the report
The existing transmission grid in Europe is located 
mainly onshore. Nonetheless, there are also grid de-
velopments offshore that should not be neglected. 
Indeed, there is also part of the transmission grid lo-
cated offshore, which includes both the connection 
of distinct onshore grids and the connection between 
offshore generation sites and onshore transmission 
grids.
Considering the EU climate and energy policy objec-
tives as binding, the grid will continue its develop-
ment offshore through the following decades to en-
able the achievement of the objectives regarding the 
EU electricity generation mix. Indeed, a significant 
increase of offshore wind power capacity is expected 
in several member states (including Germany, France, 
the Netherlands and the UK) and, consequently, also 
an increase in electricity grid located into the sea. 
Furthermore, the intended share increase in renew-
able energy technologies in the overall generation 
mix will lead to an increase in the variability and 
intermittency of electricity production. This vari-
ability can be tempered with a stronger transmission 
grid, since the latter would allow for the unrestricted 
transfer of electricity between the supply and demand 
sites, even when very distant from each other. Thus, 
it means that, besides the capacity increase in the ex-
isting lines, it will also be necessary to invest in new 
lines; and part of this transmission will inevitably be 
offshore.
Thus, grids are already developing offshore, and this 
development will continue even though at what pace 
and how they will develop is still uncertain. Indeed, 
there are different possible configurations for a fu-
ture offshore grid: it can be a simple multiplication 
of standalone lines that provide each a single service 
(either connection of generation, or connection be-
tween transmission grids); or it can be a more inte-
grated infrastructure like an offshore meshed grid 
that combines and interconnects dozens of offshore 
lines and generation units (hereafter combined solu-
tion). A combined solution can usually bring some 
advantages compared to the multiplication of indi-
vidual lines. Indeed, it typically requires fewer physi-
cal components, but has higher power capacity, which 
is commonly beneficial due to the economies of scale 
present in transmission systems. This has also been 
the case onshore with the development of the trans-
mission grid, where a combined solution approach 
has been favored for a long time now, especially since 
the introduction of both technology and operational 
standards in the previous century.
However, the development of a combined solution 
offshore is still unpredictable due to the existing un-
certainties regarding necessary technological devel-
opments. In fact, most developments offshore use a 
less-known technological system for which standards 
do not yet exist, i.e. it is based on Direct Current (DC) 
instead of Alternating Current (AC) systems; and an 
integrated solution offshore would require some tech-
nology components that are still not available today. 
Moreover, there are also strong costs uncertainties, 
not only due to the referenced uncertainties in tech-
nology development, but also due to the unclear role 
of a future offshore grid. Indeed, there are different 
visions on the possible role of an offshore grid in the 
future; while some envisioned a regional grid whose 
main role is to integrate offshore wind from Northern 
Europe, others envisioned an infrastructure which is 
integrated into a more global grid (covering EU and 
neighboring countries). 
The aim of our report is to formulate policy recom-
mendations to the European Commission (DG En-
ergy) on offshore grids and their future development. 
http://think.eui.euiv
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In order to do so, we kept in mind the existing uncer-
tainties regarding future offshore grid developments 
but, at the same time, we considered the role of regu-
lation and the importance of its proactive character.
Main findings and recommendations
Standalone lines
From our analysis of common regulatory practices as 
well as specific case-studies of regulatory procedures 
in different member states, it is clear that the frames 
that are applied to the investment in standalone lines 
are not economically sound, i.e. they are not aligned 
with the three guiding principles of an economically 
sound frame (i.e. planning, competition, and benefi-
ciaries pay). Nonetheless, there are already some pio-
neering member states (e.g. the UK) that are begin-
ning to follow a better economic approach. 
In the case of standalone lines, there is no need for a 
specific EU intervention because the possible nega-
tive economic effects are mainly local, and for the is-
sues that do require an EU intervention, we consider 
that the same intervention should be applied to stan-
dalone lines as to onshore transmission investments. 
Still, it is important to continue the policy actions that 
are ongoing for grids, onshore as well as offshore. 
At the EU level, there are important policy actions in 
place: the implementation of the third package is in-
deed ongoing, and an infrastructure package has re-
cently been proposed by the European Commission. 
At national level, it is also important to continue the 
experimentation with novel regulatory frames (e.g. 
Germany, UK and Sweden) that have been fine-tuned 
for the connection of offshore wind farms. Note that 
the EU could add value by supporting this learning 
process, for instance, by benchmarking existing prac-
tices.
Combined solutions
Our analysis of ongoing combined solution projects 
(e.g. Kriegers Flak, COBRA cable and Murray Firth 
HVDC Hub) illustrates that the difficulties faced by 
these projects under the current regulatory frames 
are tremendous. Therefore, the offshore grid develop-
ment is currently distorted towards a multiplication 
of standalone lines, even if there might already be an 
economic case for combined solutions in some pro-
jects. 
In the report, we identify  five key difficulties that are 
distorting the development of offshore grids, as well 
as the respective remedies. They are summarized in 
the below table:
Key difficulties Remedies
National frames for transmission investments that are not 
aligned
Harmonize regulatory frames for offshore transmission 
investments towards the three guiding principles of an 
economically sound frame discussed in the report, i.e. 
planning, competition and beneficiaries pay.
National renewable support schemes that are not aligned Harmonize the renewable support schemes for offshore 
wind farms
Multi-stakeholder setting with winners and losers Facilitate the ex-ante allocation of costs and benefits of 
offshore transmission investments
Offshore grid technology development constrained by 
typical R&D market failures
Speed-up offshore grid technology development
Sequential decision process in a context of uncertainty and 
irreversibility
Adapt the Community-wide transmission planning to 
offshore grids
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We consider that there could be either a soft or a stron-
ger type of EU involvement in the implementation of 
these remedies. Based on this analysis of the possible 
role of the EU, we concluded that the EU should sup-
port the national and/or regional policy implementa-
tion of the remedies with a soft EU intervention; and, 
where a regional solution is not viable, a stronger EU 
involvement is already recommended today: 
The least regret EU policy on offshore grids 
Type of EU involvement
Soft Strong
Indicative guidelines that encourage member states to follow 
the guiding principles of an economically sound regulatory 
frame for transmission investments (i.e. planning principle, 
competition principle, and beneficiaries pay principle), in 
order to reduce the distortions coming from the national 
frames
√
Promote the use of the renewable support scheme flexibility 
mechanisms for offshore wind farms (i.e. joint project and 
joint support scheme mechanisms) to reduce the distortions 
coming from the national support schemes
√
Organize the approval of transmission investment 
project packages (i.e. portfolio approach instead of cost 
benefit allocation arrangements for individual projects), 
complemented with a new mechanism to implement the 
beneficiaries pay principle for combined solutions
√ √
Include an offshore grid technology roadmap in the SET-Plan, 
within an industrial initiative driven by HVDC manufacturers, 
focused on accelerating offshore grid technology 
development required for large scale combined solutions 
(larger than in projects like Kriegers Flak, Cobra, and Moray 
Firth)
√
Develop improved transmission planning methods and 
apply them to elaborate a Twenty or Thirty Year Network 
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Introduction
We subsequently introduce the EU energy policy 
context of the report and the report scope, analytical 
frame and structure. 
EU energy policy context of the report
The development of an offshore grid may have a sig-
nificant role in the accomplishment of EU energy and 
climate objectives. The first EU objective is to have 
an internal electricity market in the EU. The third 
energy liberalization package1 has recently been put 
into force to complete the ongoing liberalization pro-
cess, and 2014 has also been put forward as an impor-
tant milestone. The second EU objective is to achieve 
the so-called 20-20-20 targets for 2020, as defined 
by the climate and energy package.2 The targets are: 
to achieve a 20% reduction in primary energy use 
compared to projected levels for 2020 by improving 
energy efficiency, to achieve a 20% reduction in EU 
greenhouse gas emission below 1990 levels, and to 
have 20% of final EU energy consumption based on 
renewable energy resources. The third EU objective is 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 80 to 95% below 
1990 levels by 2050, which has been decided by the 
European Council (EC, 2011a). 
1. The third package (EU, 2009a) consists of five legislative texts: 
(1) a Directive revisiting the internal market for electricity; (2) 
a Directive revisiting the internal market for natural gas; (3) a 
Regulation on conditions for access to the natural gas transmis-
sion networks; (4) a Regulation revisiting the conditions for ac-
cess to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity; (5) a 
Regulation establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators.
2. The climate and energy package (EU, 2009b) consists of four 
legislative texts: (1) a Directive revising the EU ETS; (2) an “ef-
fort-sharing” Decision setting binding national targets for emis-
sions from sectors not covered by the EU ETS; (3) a Directive set-
ting binding national targets for increasing the share of renewable 
energy sources in the energy mix; and (4) a Directive creating a 
legal framework for the safe and environmentally sound use of 
carbon capture and storage technologies.
The roadmap for a low carbon economy released by 
the European Commission (EC, 2011b) indicates that 
achieving these objectives would imply an almost 
complete decarbonization of the power sector with 
domestic emission reduction of 93-99% compared 
to 1990 levels. This transition will require massive in-
vestments:
•	 Grid investments: the European Commission has 
estimated that about 140 billion euro is needed for 
“high voltage electricity transmission systems, both 
onshore and offshore, storage, and smart grid appli-
cations at transmission and distribution levels”, for 
which it has proposed an “infrastructure package” 
(EC, 2011c). The package is about streamlining 
the permit granting procedures, facilitating the 
regulatory treatment of projects of common in-
terest, and ensuring the implementation of these 
projects with direct EU financial support where 
needed. The number one priority project in this 
package is the Northern Seas offshore grid, i.e. “an 
integrated offshore electricity grid in the North Sea, 
the Irish Sea, the English Channel, the Baltic Sea 
and neighboring waters to transport electricity from 
renewable offshore energy sources to centers of con-
sumption and storage and to increase cross-border 
electricity exchange”. The European Commission 
also assigned a so-called European coordinator to 
the Baltic and North Seas off-shore wind connec-
tions, bringing stakeholders together to discuss 
the issues and identify solutions (Adamowitsch, 
2010). This has also led to the establishment of 
the North Seas Countries’ Offshore Grid Initiative 
(NSCOGI, 2010), which is currently examining 
how to overcome the difficulties at the regional 
level. 
•	 Grid technology development investments: in 
the context of the Strategic Energy Technology 
Plan (EC, 2009; THINK, 2011a), so-called indus-
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trial initiatives have been used to come up with 
technology roadmaps that list the research, de-
velopment and demonstration activities that will 
need to be supported to achieve the 2020 and 2050 
targets. The roadmaps include activities related 
to grids, onshore and offshore, but the plan also 
identified a financing gap of about 47-60 billion 
euro, calling for more public support from mem-
ber states and the EU level for joint public private 
initiatives. 
Report scope, analytical frame, and 
structure
This 5th report of THINK formulates policy recom-
mendations to the European Commission (DG Ener-
gy) on offshore grids in the context described above. 
In this context, there will inevitably be some grid de-
velopment offshore, but the importance of this devel-
opment is uncertain (Box 1). Furthermore, it is also 
uncertain how this offshore grid will develop: there 
could be a multiplication of standalone lines, which 
already exist today; and there could also be a transi-
tion towards combined solutions, which do not yet 
exist. The analytical approach in this report is based 
on this typology:
•	 Multiplication of standalone lines (Figure 1, 
left): in the illustrated case, there are two offshore 
wind farms to be connected to shore, interconnec-
tion capacity is created between the two onshore 
grids (with a so-called interconnector), and con-
gestion in one of the two onshore grids is relieved 
with an offshore line (with a so-called bootstrap). 
This is achieved with what we refer to in this re-
port as two “farm to shore” investments, and two 
“shore to shore” investments. The illustration as-
sumes that the individual investments would use 
High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) technology 
so that each of them would require a cable and two 
so-called converter stations (see annex 2 for more 
detailed explanations regarding technology).
•	 Combined solutions (Figure 1, right): in the il-
lustrated case, combining the farm to shore and 
shore to shore investments in a mixed investment 
would reduce the number of converter stations 
from 8 to 53 -and, despite the number of cables be-
ing the same as in the non-combined solution, the 
total cable length decreases. The capacity of the 
cables and converter stations increases, but given 
the economies of scale, the effect on total costs 
of the reduction of number of assets and lengths 
dominates the capacity effect. The economic case 
for combined solutions is however very uncertain 
due to the advanced HVDC hardware and soft-
3. Considering that 2 of these 5 converter stations would be multi-
terminal, i.e. having more than one incoming or outgoing cable.
                                           
 Combined solutions Standalone lines
Figure 1 – Alternative offshore grid developments 
Legend:   wind farm;   converter station; − HVDC cable;  - - HVAC)
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ware that is needed and not yet on the shelves to-
day.
Despite the above introduced uncertainties regarding 
the development of offshore grids, and especially re-
garding the development of combined solutions, it is 
important to proactively assess and adapt where nec-
essary the current EU and national regulatory frames 
that apply to these investments. Based on this assess-
ment we provide recommendations for the European 
Commission to take initiatives towards a least regret 
EU policy.
The report is organized in three chapters, each focus-
ing on the 3 different settings presented above: shore 
to shore, farm to shore, and combined solutions.
1. Shore to shore standalone lines 
In this chapter, we find that the economic features 
(i.e. the network externalities, cost and technology 
uncertainties, and economies of scale) of shore to 
shore investments are similar to onshore transmis-
sion expansions. The offshore regulatory frame can 
therefore be the same as onshore. The current frames 
for transmission expansion investments are however 
economically unsound, both onshore and offshore. 
This is a problem from the perspective of EU objec-
tives because it leads to underinvestment, while the 
achievement of these objectives relies on transmis-
sion expansion (see introduction).
The chapter is structured in three sections: section 
1.1. gives an overview of shore to shore projects, sec-
tion 1.2. discusses the importance of the three guid-
ing principles for an economically sound regulatory 
frame, and  section 1.3. then assesses the current reg-
ulatory frames according to these principles. 
Box 1: Uncertainty regarding role of an offshore grid 
The possible role of an offshore grid in the future grid 
is uncertain (Figure 2, and Annex 1 for an overview): 
ranging from an offshore grid to integrate offshore 
wind in the North of Europe (e.g. Trade Wind, 2010; 
Stattnet, 2008; Friends of the Super grid, 2010; and 
Greenpeace/3E, 2008); to an offshore grid that is part 
of a larger High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) overlay 
grid that also extends across the Mediterranean Sea 
into North Africa (e.g. Desertec, 2009; EWEA, 2010; 
EREC/Greenpeace, 2010); up to an offshore grid as 
part of a futuristic global grid (e.g. WWF, 2010). 
Note that these future grid visions have been inspired 
by the ongoing discussion on the possible pathways 
towards a low carbon energy system by 2050. In one 
of our previous reports (THINK, 2011b), we analyzed 
several of the pathways presented by stakeholders. 
According to these stakeholder visions, offshore wind 
generation will be a significant share of the 2050 in-
stalled electricity generation capacity mix: in Eurelec-
tric (2010) this is 8.5%; in ECF (2010) this is between 
2% and 15% for scenarios with between 40% and 80% 
renewable energy; in IEA (2010) this is 7.9%; and in 
EREC/Greenpeace (2010) offshore wind is said to be 
important, but it is not quantified. 
Note also that on the 2020 horizon, offshore wind 
farms are expected to increase from the existing 3 GW 
of installed capacity to about 40 GW, that is, at least, if 
member states follow the National Renewable Energy 
Action Plans they recently submitted to the European 
Commission, in charge of monitoring progress to the 
binding 2020 targets (EC, 2011d).
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1.1 Overview of short to shore 
projects
Figure 3 maps the 29 existing and planned4 projects 
listed in Annex 3. These standalone lines are point to 
point connections between two onshore grids. Most 
of the projects are international, connecting two 
countries, with a few exceptions, such as the intercon-
nections between Sweden mainland and the Gotland 
Island. Almost every country with a shore has at least 
one shore to shore line. The total capacity of the pro-
jects listed in the annex is 15360 MW.
The projects come in different scales (between 60 and 
2000 MW), covering a wide range of distances (be-
tween 15 and 580 km), and typically use HVDC tech-
nology5, with a few exceptions, such as the submarine 
AC cable between Morocco and Spain. 
4. There are many more projects that are in the planning phase. 
We only included the larger ones, that are already under con-
struction or at an advanced planning stage.
5. Traditionally only HVDC Current Source Converters (CSC) 
were used, but more recently HVDC Voltage Source Converters 
(VSC) have also been used.
These shore to shore investments have economic fea-
tures that are similar to the investments to expand the 
grid onshore: 
•	 First are network externalities. Both onshore and 
offshore, there is a need to coordinate transmis-
sion expansion investments, due to the existing 
network externalities. Traditionally AC overhead 
lines have been used for transmission expansions, 
but increasingly HVDC is considered offshore (for 
instance, due to the distance limitations of AC ca-
bles) as well as onshore (for instance, due to the 
increasing opposition against traditional overhead 
lines). Note that the users of an HVDC transmis-
sion system can be more easily identified because 
the flows across can be traced and controlled, 
which is less the case for AC systems. A nuance 
is that additional flow controlling equipment can 
also be installed in an AC grid, which has already 
been done in some member states (Van Hertem, 
2009; Van Hertem et al., 2010).
•	 Second are the cost and technology uncertain-
ties. The social welfare assessments for intercon-
Figure 2 – Future grid visions (Trade Wind, 2010; Desertec, 2009; WWF, 2010)
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nectors are typically highly uncertain. It is indeed 
hard to predict future prices and supply and de-
mand curves. Moreover, cost and technology un-
certainties are increasing, for instance because of 
the increasing opposition against the traditional 
overhead lines. The offshore cost and technology 
uncertainties are also significant because it con-
cerns a so-called greenfield investment, rather 
than an incremental investment.
•	 Third are economies of scale. A typical onshore 
transmission expansion has strong economies of 
scale, and this is also the case for shore to shore 
investments. 
1.2 Importance of the guiding 
principles
In this section, we discuss the importance of the three 
guiding principles for an economically sound regu-
latory frame for shore to shore investments, i.e. the 
planning, competition, and beneficiaries pay princi-
ples. 
1.2.1 Importance of the planning principle
The importance of transmission planning follows 
from the need to coordinate transmission expansions 
with the demand for transmission, taking into ac-
count the economies of scale and network externali-
Figure 3 – Mapping of the 29 shore to shore projects (see Annex 3)
(Size of the bubbles represents the power capacity of the connections)
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ties of transmission investments. 
Transmission planning needs to be carried out by an 
entity that can act on behalf of existing and future 
grid users in developing transmission services, which 
is typically the Transmission System Operator (TSO) 
in Europe.6 TSO involvement in both connection and 
transmission planning also ensures that there is coor-
dination between the two, onshore as well as offshore. 
The role of the TSO is to present the costs and ben-
efits of the proposed investments to the regulator; and 
the regulator then decides whether or not to approve 
these investments. Approved investments go into the 
so-called Regulated Asset Base, which implies that 
they receive a regulated rate of return. The role of the 
regulator is therefore to make sure that grid users get 
value for money. 
More recently, regulatory theory (and practice) is also 
emphasizing that participation of grid users into the 
procedure is needed to reduce the risk of stranded 
costs, and to give the regulator confidence that the 
demand for transmission capacity, as presented by the 
TSO, is real (Littlechild & Cornwall 2009, Littlechild 
& Skerk 2008, Brattle Group, 2007b; Hogan, 2011). 
Indeed, the regulator cannot observe if the regulated 
company is investing too much or too little because 
the impact of the investments on the performance 
of the network cannot be clearly observed. Further-
more, the demand for transmission services is quite 
uncertain so that the risks for stranded costs are high. 
1.2.2 Importance of the competition principle
Competition can be introduced through tendering, 
6. Note that the TSOs that are common in Europe own and oper-
ate the grid, but there are also alternative institutional arrange-
ments to organize transmission, like the model of an Independent 
System Operator (ISO) that is separated from the transmission 
owner (TO). 
which is especially important when there are cost 
and technology uncertainties (Rious 2006, Alexander 
2006). Tendering for the participation of third par-
ties in part of the investment decisions incentivizes 
innovation and reduces the problem of information 
asymmetry between the TSO doing the planning and 
the regulator. 
Note that transmission expansions onshore, contrari-
ly to offshore, are typically incremental investments 
in an existing grid, which can be many small invest-
ments that are more difficult to delegate. The coor-
dination cost of tendering could therefore be higher 
than the potential gain from adding competition. But 
an element of competition can also be added by al-
lowing third parties to propose projects to the regula-
tor so that the TSO can be contested. 
1.2.3 Importance of the beneficiaries pay 
principle
Making the beneficiaries pay is important to signal 
the costs of their demand for transmission services. 
The users of a transmission line are important benefi-
ciaries of the line. By letting these users pay for their 
usage of the line, they internalize the costs into their 
generation and consumption decisions that imply a 
certain demand for transmission services on that line. 
This can be implemented by auctioning transmission 
access rights or by internalizing the allocation of 
transmission capacity into the organized electricity 
market. 
The revenue generated in this way would however not 
be enough to pay for the level of investment that max-
imizes the costs and benefits of transmission expan-
sions. As demonstrated in Pérez-Arriaga et al. (1995), 
this is because there are economies of scale in trans-
mission, investments are typically lumpy, and there 
http://think.eui.eu 7
Offshore Grids: Towards a Least Regret EU Policy
are reliability constraints, and unavoidable planning 
mistakes. 
In other words, transmission investments generate 
public good type of benefits, such as improved sys-
tem supply security, and stronger competition among 
generators so that the usage of the network is not 
enough to support the optimal level of investment 
(Benjamin, 2007; Latorre et al., 2003; Borestein et al., 
2000; Sauma-Oren, 2007; Sun et al., 2004). Therefore, 
at least part of the costs needs to be covered with 
transmission tariffs. Note that this is then also the 
reason why the merchant business model for trans-
mission that solely relies on revenues from allocating 
transmission access rights will lead to underinvest-
ment (Hauteclocque and Rious, 2009; Sauma and 
Oren, 2009; Stoft, 2009). 
Tariff design is then about allocating costs to different 
types of grids users (e.g. consumers, generators, and 
storage) with different usage profiles (e.g. energy, ca-
pacity, and load profile).  Box 2 elaborates on another 
issue regarding transmission charging, which is the 
importance of providing economic signals to genera-
tors in transmission tariffs.
To sum up, in order to minimize the total cost of 
the investment in generation and its complement-
ing transmission investment, it is important to follow 
the above discussed guiding principles for an eco-
nomically sound frame, as recommended by regula-
tory theory (see also: De Jong and Hakvoort, 2006; 
Hogan, 2011; RealiseGrid, 2009; Sauma and Oren, 
2006, 2007; Stoft, 2009; Joskow-Tirole, 2005; Olmos 
and Pérez-Arriaga, 2009; Pérez-Arriaga and Smeers, 
2003; Joskow, 2009).
Box 2: Transmission charging 
see THINK (2012) for a more detailed discussion of transmission tariff design). 
Locational signals can be given through the auction-
ing of transmission access rights. Indeed, under nodal 
pricing, the costs of transmission constraints are em-
bedded in the electricity prices, which is not the case 
when uniform pricing is applied. Locational signals 
can also come from transmission tariffs. Indeed, tar-
iffs allocate costs to different categories of grid users, 
which implies deciding which costs to allocate to con-
sumers versus generators; to high voltage versus low 
voltage grid users; to different usage profiles (energy 
versus capacity); and to grid users in different loca-
tions.
In practice, many member states however preferred 
the simplicity and transparency of postage stamp tar-
iffs, i.e. without locational differentiation. Another rea-
son is that the tariffs in most member states allocate 
most or all costs to consumers, while locational sig-
nals in tariffs would be more useful if also generators 
would be exposed to them. Note that allocating fixed 
cost to less elastic players, which in the electricity sys-
tem are the consumers, is the economic principle of 
Boiteux 2nd Best/Ramsey pricing (Greer, 2010). 
Note however that the elasticity of the load increases 
with the new developments of distributed generation 
and storage. Note finally that there is an EU cap on 
the share of transmission costs that can be allocated 
to generators (G-component), which has been intro-
duced to limit the internal market distortions from 
having non-harmonized G-component in national 
transmission tariffs. 
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1.3 Assessment of the current 
regulatory frames for shore to shore 
investments
In this section, we assess the current regulatory frames 
for shore to shore investments according to the three 
guiding principles of an economically sound frame.
1.3.1 Assessment according to the planning 
principle 
In Europe, transmission planning is done by national 
TSOs and approved by national regulatory authori-
ties, while the national decisions also have implica-
tions for grid users across the border that are not 
taken into account in the decisions. Coordination 
between national investments is also limited. In other 
words, despite the strong interdependencies between 
national grid investments, planning is currently 
mainly done at the national level, which is not in line 
with the planning principle.
An exception is the indicative Community-wide 
planning procedure that has recently been intro-
duced by the third package – the Ten Year Network 
Development Plan (EU, 2009a).The plan will be made 
by the newly created European Network of Transmis-
sion System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). 
ENTSO-E is an official body of TSOs that is mandat-
ed to carry out certain tasks that have been assigned 
to TSOs by the third package. This institution has also 
replaced the former voluntary associations of Euro-
pean TSOs called ETSO, and regional TSO associa-
tions, such as UCTE for the Continent and Nordel for 
Scandinavia. 
The pilot version of the TYNDP published in March 
2010 was however mainly bottom-up, while future 
versions are expected to combine such an approach 
with a more top-down approach starting from the 
Community wide interests rather than the national 
interests to make the TYNDP. Finally, note that pub-
lic consultation procedures on the TYNDP are re-
quired, which is also an important step towards the 
planning principle. 
Note also that the newly created Agency for Coop-
eration of Energy Regulators (ACER) is to provide an 
opinion on the plan that will be presented by ENT-
SO-E on a biannual basis starting from March 2011. 
ACER can also recommend amendments to the na-
tional plans in case of inconsistencies, and national 
regulatory authorities are required to check the con-
sistency of their national plans with the TYNDP. 
1.3.2 Assessment according to the competi-
tion principle
In most EU member states, the only way for third 
parties to contest the regulated transmission expan-
sion business of the TSOs, is to apply for a so-called 
exemption for a merchant project (option 1), with the 
exception of the UK and Belgium where it is also con-
sidered for regulated projects (option 2).
First option is the use of exemptions for merchant 
projects that are negotiated on a case-by-case ba-
sis (Kessel et al., 2011). These projects can however 
only be exceptionally approved under the EU regu-
latory frame. For instance in the case of the Estlink 
project between Finland and Estonia (commissioned 
in 2006, 105 km, and 350 MW), a consortium of 
generators has been allowed to construct an inter-
connector. Priority access to this interconnector has 
been granted to these generators for a period that is 
limited in time. After this period, the ownership will 
be transferred to the national TSOs and the regulated 
third party access rules will apply. The reason to grant 
the exemption has been that the benefits of the pro-
ject were uncertain, while the impact on the Estonian 
transmission tariff could have been significant if a 
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regulated rate of return would have been guaranteed 
to the project. Relaxing the regulatory conditions for 
merchant projects could improve the contestability 
of the transmission expansion business, but the mer-
chant business model cannot support an adequate 
level of investment (see section 1.2.3).
Second option is to allow third parties to develop 
projects that are (partly) financed with transmission 
tariffs. For instance in the case of the Nemo project 
between the UK and Belgium, this is currently con-
sidered (expected commissioning 2016-2018, 100 
km, 1000 MW). Note that it is the first time that such 
a scheme is possible in the EU, but in the US this 
model is more common; see for instance the Trans 
Bay Cable project (Coxe and Meeus, 2010). 
1.3.3 Assessment according to the beneficia-
ries pay principle
The allocation of costs and benefits of transmission 
expansion investments in Europe is purely national 
for investments within a member state, and for in-
vestments between member states there is typically 
an ad-hoc bilateral agreement. For instance in the 
case of NorNed (commissioned in 2008, 580 km, and 
700 MW), the Norwegian TSO and the Dutch TSO 
proposed to their national regulatory authorities that 
they would each bear half of the total project cost. The 
regulators have approved these costs, meaning that 
they are covered by the national transmission tariffs 
in case the revenue from allocating the usage rights 
of the interconnector would have been lower than the 
costs of the project. Other beneficiaries did not par-
ticipate in the development of this project, and as a 
result the project has been designed to optimize the 
national interests of the two countries that are being 
interconnected, while this project received significant 
EU support (Meeus et al., 2004).
Community-wide indicative planning therefore 
needs to be backed by an ex-ante allocation of costs 
and benefits that is facilitated at EU level to go be-
yond the ad-hoc bilateral agreements, as in NorNed, 
that are suboptimal from the European point of view. 
This facilitation could include a new mechanism for 
infrastructure investments that would be ex-ante 
rather than ex-post,7 and a portfolio approach that 
would reduce the need for compensation by approv-
ing many projects at the same time so that the cost 
and benefit asymmetries are less problematic as they 
are for individual projects (see THINK, 2012). The re-
cently proposed infrastructure package (EC, 2011c) is 
a step in this direction. Note that EU funding8 would 
not necessarily be needed if the ex-ante allocation of 
costs and benefits would be adequately facilitated at 
EU level.
To sum up, the current regulatory frames applied to 
shore to shore investments are mainly national and 
economically unsound. The NorNed and Estlink 
projects are illustrative for the resulting suboptimal 
investments, while the frame that has been designed 
for the Nemo project seems to be a step towards the 
guiding principles (Box 3). This is a problem from 
the perspective of EU objectives because it leads to 
underinvestment, while the achievement of these ob-
jectives relies on transmission expansion investments 
7. Note that there is an inter-TSO mechanism that defines com-
pensation rules between TSOs whose grid users cause transits 
and TSOs that incur costs due to transits (FSR, 2005; Olmos, 
2007), but it is ex-post based and limited to operation costs such 
as losses. Moreover, currently ITC mechanism is limited to the 
allocation of 100 M€, which is a very small figure compared to the 
needed EU transmission investments.
8. Examples of EU funding are the Trans-European Network pro-
gram (EU, 2003; EU, 2004; EU, 2009), the European Economic 
Recovery Program (EC, 2008) and the European Investment 
Bank. EU funding has been traditionally used to finance feasi-
bility studies for projects of common European interest (typical 
functioning of the Trans-European Network Policy until the Re-
covery Program) and has also given limited support to the con-
struction of these projects, but this support is marginal in com-
parison with the scale of the investments that are needed.
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(see introduction). This problem is however not spe-
cific to offshore, so that the ongoing process of the 
third package and the infrastructure package to find 
a solution for onshore would also help solve the shore 
to shore problem.
2. Farm to shore standalone lines
In this chapter, we find that: farm to shore invest-
ments are featured with stronger network externali-
ties, higher cost and technology uncertainties, and 
larger economies of scale than the investments to 
connect a generator onshore. The regulatory frame 
for the connection of a generator onshore therefore 
needs to be fine-tuned for offshore investments. The 
current frames for connecting generators are how-
ever economically unsound, both onshore and off-
shore. Offshore this is more problematic because the 
economic features mentioned above are stronger, but 
this might not be a problem from the perspective of 
EU objectives since the negative economic effects are 
mainly local.
The chapter is structured in three sections: section 
2.1 gives an overview of farm to shore projects, sec-
tion 2.2 discusses the importance of the three guid-
ing principles for an economically sound regulatory 
frame, and  section 2.3 then assesses the current regu-
latory frames according to these principles. 
Box 3: Summarizing the assessment of the regulatory frames for shore to shore investments 
NorNed (Meeus et al., 2004; NornedAuction, 2011; 
TenneT, 2004), i.e. project between Norway and the 
Netherlands: nationally planned (first principle: or-
ange); the design and development of the project has 
not been subjected to competition (second principle: 
red); bilateral ad-hoc agreement to split the costs be-
tween the involved countries (third principle: orange).
Estlink (Aarna, 2006; Nordic Energy Link SA, 2011; Van-
dezande et al., 2006), i.e. project between Finland and 
Estonia: nationally planned (first principle: orange); 
merchant project (second principle: orange); mer-
chant project (third principle: red).
Nemo (Ofgem and CREG, 2011; Crouch, 2011), i.e. pro-
ject between the UK and Belgium: nationally planned 
(first principle: orange); the design and development 
of the project will be subjected to competition (sec-
ond principle: green); bilateral ad-hoc agreement to 










Offshore Grids: Towards a Least Regret EU Policy
2.1 Overview of farm to shore 
projects
Figure 4 maps the 53 existing and planned9 projects 
listed in Annex 4. These standalone lines are the point 
to point connections of offshore wind farms with the 
transmission grid. Within these lines, we can distin-
guish two types of projects: old and new. 
•	 Old type of projects are relatively close to shore 
(between 0.01 km and 53 km, with a median value 
of 7 km), relatively small scale (between 2 and 504 
MW), and using a Medium or High Voltage Al-
ternative Current (MVAC or HVAC) transmission 
system. 
9. There are many more projects that are in the “planning” phase. 
We included a few examples that are relatively more advanced 
and that are illustrative for what we refer to with “new” type of 
farm to shore investments (see for instance, http://www.lorc.dk/
Knowledge/Offshore-renewables-map/Offshore-wind-farms).
•	 New type of projects are relatively large scale 
(between 400 and 864 MW)10, far from shore (be-
tween 130 km and 330 km), and using a HVDC 
VSC transmission system. Figure 4 only includes 
new type of farm to shore investments located 
in Germany, but they are also expected in other 
member states. For instance in the UK, the most 
recent round of concessions allocation focused on 
this type of projects.11
10. Note that 7 MW HVDC VSC Tjaereborg project in Denmark 
has been developed to demonstrate on a small scale the applica-
tion of this new technology for connection of large-scale offshore 
wind farms and with distances above 50 km from the coastline 
(http://www05.abb.com/global/scot/scot221.nsf/veritydisplay/00
36819698281f84c1256fda003b4d32/$file/tjaereborg.new.pdf)
11. Round 3, of the Crown Estate tender in 2009, allocated 9 
concessions representing a total of 32.2 GW (http://www.the-
crownestate.co.uk/our_portfolio/marine/offshore_wind_energy/
round3/r3-developers.htm). Almost 20 GW of this total, which 
will be commissioned after 2015, corresponds to new type of farm 
to shore (large scale, far to shore, HVDC connection) (see for in-
Figure 4 – Mapping of the 53 farm to shore projects (see Annex 4)
(Size of the bubbles represents the power capacity of the connection)
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Note that the total capacity of the projects listed in 
the annex is 7,129 MW. The EU member states with 
offshore wind farms include Belgium (195 MW), 
Denmark (875 MW), Finland (32 MW), Germany 
(3,560 MW), Ireland (25 MW), the Netherlands (247 
MW), Norway (2 MW), Sweden (163 MW), and the 
UK (2,029 MW). 
These farm to shore investments, especially the ones 
classified as new type, have economic features that 
are stronger than the features of the investment to 
connect a generator onshore, which we will illustrate 
with the Borwin project (Figure 5, and the new type 
of projects in Figure 4). 
•	 First are stronger network externalities. Most 
generators onshore can be located near the exist-
ing transmission grid and can be relatively easily 
connected. Indeed, grids are normally well de-
veloped and meshed onshore. Moreover, conven-
tional generators are mainly thermal gas power 
plants, which have a certain flexibility concerning 
the choice of their location. Exceptions onshore 
can be large hydro or onshore wind farms located 
far away from the existing onshore transmission 
grid. Offshore, these exceptions are however be-
coming the rule. In the case of Borwin, three off-
shore wind farms with a total installed capacity of 
1200 MW at 200 km distance from shore needed 
to be connected to the onshore transmission grid. 
Close to shore the existing grid is typically weak 
because generation used to be located inland, and 
it is also already congested because it has become 
more favorable to locate onshore generation in 
this area, e.g. there are more favorable conditions 
for onshore wind farms, and harbors are attractive 
to reduce the cost of importing coal. Therefore it 
stance: www.thecrownestate.co.uk/round3_connection_study.
pdf).
is more likely that grid reinforcements are needed 
when connecting an offshore wind farm.
•	 Second are stronger cost and technology uncer-
tainties. As said above, most generators can be 
connected relatively easily. Indeed, a typical con-
nection is relatively cheap, and uses well-known 
AC transmission systems. In the case of Borwin, 
the offshore wind farms have however been con-
nected using the less known HVDC VSC systems. 
In general, the experience offshore with the instal-
lation, operation and maintenance of transmission 
assets is much more limited than onshore. For in-
stance, the salted water environment requires the 
components to be more resistant to corrosion. 
Moreover, offshore transmission systems are built 
from scratch so that there are more degrees of 
freedom in the investment decision that could be 
explored, i.e. greenfield investment. 
•	 Third are stronger economies of scale. There are 
always economies of scale in transmission invest-
ments (i.e. cost per unit of transmission decreases 
for increasing capacities), but there are not nec-
essarily several generators asking to be connected 
in same area around the same time. This can be 
exceptionally the case onshore, but offshore this is 
typically the case. Indeed, in the case of Borwin, 
three offshore wind farms share a connection to 
shore. The HVDC system that has been developed 
consists of a DC cable with two converter stations, 
one to convert the AC output of the wind turbines 
into DC, and one to reconvert the DC output 
of the cable into the AC of the existing onshore 
grid. By coordinating the connection of the three 
wind farms in Borwin in two phases only three 
converter stations and one cable to shore will be 
used, instead of six stations and three cables (i.e. a 
400 MW connection was commissioned in 2009, 
which is expected to be upgraded in 2012 with an 
additional 800 MW for a total cost of about 1200 
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M€). In other words, the project has benefited 
from having several wind farms sharing their con-
nection to shore, which is referred to as wind farm 
clustering.
Note also that the transmission investment to connect 
an offshore wind generator is a significant part of the 
total project cost, which is much less the case for the 
connection of onshore generators. For instance, grid 
connections for onshore wind account for 5 to 10% 
of the total project cost, while offshore this share is 
between 15 and 25%. Grid connection costs depend 
on the distance to the connection point,  type of ter-
rain to be crossed, the voltage level of connection, the 
availability of infrastructure such as transformer sta-
tions or substations and on the technical requirement 
as laid out in national regulations. See, for instance, 
Green-Vasilakos (2011), Weißensteiner et al. (2011), 
Obersteiner et al. (2006), Swider et al. (2008), Auer et 
al. (2007), and EWEA (2009).
2.2 Importance of the three guiding 
principles
In this section, we discuss the importance of the three 
guiding principles for an economically sound regu-
latory frame for farm to shore investments, i.e. the 
planning, competition, and beneficiaries pay princi-
ples.
2.2.1 Importance of the planning principle
The importance of connection planning follows from 
the economies of scale that can be achieved by coor-
dinating the connection of generators that are asking 
to be connected in the same area around the same 
time. The coordination can be beneficial for the in-
frastructure to connect the generators to the existing 
grid, and for the reinforcements that are needed in 
this grid.
Then, the investment decisions need to be made by 
an entity representing several generators, including 
those that are asking to be connected today and, those 
that are expected to need connection tomorrow, and 
 5a. Schematic representation of Borwin – phases 1 & 2       5b. Borwin Alpha, VSC HVSC converter station
Figure 5 – Borwin: the project in pictures
Sources: TenneT (2010) and ABB (2011)
http://think.eui.eu14
Final Report - January 2012
other grid users. Hence, it suggests the proactive in-
volvement of TSOs. It also suggests the participation 
of generators having better information about their 
demand for transmission services, for instance, by or-
ganizing group connection procedures, or auctioning 
of connection slots. 
2.2.2 Importance of the competition principle
Tenders can be organized to introduce competition 
for who is allowed to own, build, and operate the 
transmission assets to connect a generator to the ex-
isting grid. 
The benefits of competitive tendering include incen-
tivizing innovation in the design of a transmission 
connection, including the technological system and 
the contractual arrangements to share the risks be-
tween the relevant stakeholders. Benefits can also 
include the reduction of information asymmetry be-
tween the regulatory entity and the regulated TSO. 
Tendering should however only be used when these 
benefits outweigh the additional costs related to the 
organization and administration of the tender.
2.2.3 Importance of the beneficiaries pay 
principle
Making the beneficiaries pay is important to signal 
the costs of their demand for connection services. By 
letting them pay for their connection, generators in-
ternalize the cost of the total investment in their gen-
Box 4: Connection charging 
Interaction with other network cost signals that 
can be given to generators: connection charging 
options are typically analyzed in combination with 
different energy pricing and network tariffs designs. 
Some propose deep charges combined with short 
run nodal/zonal energy prices (see for instance New-
bery, 2011), others propose super shallow connection 
charges combined with locational long run network 
tariffs, (see for instance Bell et al 2011, Baldick et al. 
2011). For instance in the UK, super shallow connec-
tion charges are currently applied to generators, while 
generators pay for part of their connection because 
part of the network costs are recovered from genera-
tors (so-called G-component in transmission tariffs 
with locational signals, see Box 2). 
Interaction with renewable support schemes: spe-
cial rules for renewable energy generation, like con-
nection priority (means that a renewable generator 
can short-cut the queue of first come first serve con-
nection regime) or access/dispatch priority (means 
that in case of limited access capacity at one particu-
lar moment, renewable generators have the prior-
ity to access to the network), and exempting these 
generators from connection charges are being used 
to facilitate the integration of these technologies. This 
is however not economically sound and a better way 
to support renewable generation would be to expose 
them to the same economic signals as conventional 
generators regarding when and where to connect, 
but to include a component for an efficient connec-
tion investment in their support scheme. In support 
schemes, such as feed-in tariffs or premiums, the com-
ponent can be directly included by increasing the 
level of support, while in green certificates schemes it 
can be included indirectly by increasing the penalty or 
the price cap of green certificate. Clearly, this would be 
more cost reflective and transparent (see for instance 
Hiroux and Saguan, 2010; Madrigal and Stoft, 2011; 
and the ongoing CEER public consultation, 2011). 
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eration investment decisions. Generators can indeed 
have several options on where to locate and, even if 
their decision on where to locate is dominated by oth-
er factors, making them pay for their connection can 
incentivize them to proactively participate in connec-
tion planning, which can reduce the cost of their con-
nection. 
Box 4 elaborates on two additional issues regarding 
connection charging, which is its interaction with 
other network cost signals that can be given to gen-
erators; and its interaction with renewable support 
schemes for renewable energy technologies. 
To sum up, in order to minimize the total cost of 
the investment in generation and its complementing 
transmission investment, it is important to follow the 
above discussed guiding principles for an economi-
cally sound frame, as recommended by regulatory 
theory (see also: Sauma-Oren, 2006a, 2006b, 2007; 
Rious et al 2010; Madrigal-Stoft, 2011; Groppi-Fum-
agalli 2011.)
2.3 Assessment of the current 
regulatory frames for farm to shore 
investments
In this section, we assess the current regulatory frames 
for farm to shore investments according to the three 
guiding principles of an economically sound frame.
2.3.1 Assessment according to the planning 
principle 
In Europe, connections are dealt with on a first-
come-first-serve basis by the national TSOs, and the 
participation of generators is limited. Such a reactive 
connection planning strategy whereby transmission 
follows generation is increasingly problematic be-
cause most plants that are currently constructed, such 
as gas plants and renewable energy plants, are rela-
tively quick to market, while transmission is facing 
increasing opposition so that its reaction comes too 
late if it continues to follow generation. 
A more proactive planning would imply that the TSO 
anticipates possible investments by starting to devel-
op transmission projects, by applying for the neces-
sary permits e.g., to reduce the time to commission a 
transmission investment, if and once approved. This 
is however only possible if the regulatory frame al-
lows/encourages the TSO to make such anticipatory 
costs. Especially offshore, it is important to be proac-
tive due to the stronger economies of scale and net-
work externalities.
The German frame illustrates how advanced con-
nection planning can be implemented. The Borwin 
project was indeed only possible because the farm to 
shore investment made in 2009 created overcapac-
ity to be used by an offshore wind farm expected in 
2012. In other words, the regulatory frame has en-
couraged the TSO to propose, and the regulator to 
approve, an anticipatory investment that is expected 
to be beneficial in the future, while there is also a risk 
for stranded assets in case the expected offshore wind 
farm development does not materialize. Moreover the 
so-called DENA studies in Germany (DENA, 2005, 
2010, 2011), illustrate how to plan for the impact of 
onshore and offshore wind farms on the existing grid.
Note that the German regulatory frame also includes 
an interesting role for the Federal Maritime and Hy-
drographic Agency (BSH, 2011). The Agency produc-
es an annual report, with the identification of existing 
and planned offshore facilities, in order to facilitate 
maritime planning. TSOs use this information to per-
form their connection planning. 
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2.3.2 Assessment according to the competi-
tion principle
With the exception of few member states, as for in-
stance France (Rious, 2006), the transmission invest-
ment to connect a generator in Europe can only be 
done by TSOs that cannot be contested neither in the 
design nor in the development of connections. 
This will be increasingly problematic as the amount 
of new type of generators that needs to be connected 
will probably increase in order to comply with the 
2020 and 2050 energy policy ambitions. This is es-
pecially the case offshore because the cost and tech-
nology uncertainties that apply to farm to shore in-
vestments are stronger than for the connection of a 
generator onshore.
The UK frame illustrates how competitive tendering 
can be implemented (Ofgem, 200; 2010; 2011a and 
b). The tender is envisaged to encompass the build-
ing, ownership, and operation of the transmission 
systems that connect offshore wind farms to shore. 
The winner of the tender is then the most interesting 
proposal to provide these transmission connection 
services for the lowest regulated income. Note that 
generators can also choose not to tender, but to do 
the farm to shore investment themselves. 
The first so-called Offshore Transmission Owner 
(OFTO) license has been awarded in 2010 for the 
project Robin Rigg, which a 180 MW offshore wind 
farm at 8 km from shore. The Robin Rigg wind devel-
oper had already started to develop the farm to shore 
investment under the previous regulatory frame so 
that this tender has only been about transferring the 
ownership and operation of the transmission assets. 
For the first tender round that included Robin Rigg 
and other projects for a total value of 1.1bn GBP, 
Ofgem has estimated savings to be in the range of 
350mn GBP thanks to market entry and the sourcing 
of funds.
2.3.3 Assessment according to the beneficia-
ries pay principle
In Europe, super shallow charging whereby the gen-
erator almost does not pay for its connection is not 
uncommon.12 For instance, renewable generators are 
often (partly) exempted from connection charges. 
This is problematic because it implies that these gen-
erators do not take into account the cost of connec-
tion in their investment decisions. Especially offshore 
this is an issue because it also hinders the implemen-
tation of more advanced connection planning, which 
is opportune offshore.
The UK and Swedish frames illustrate how offshore 
wind farms can be charged for the costs of their con-
nection. 
To sum up, the current regulatory frames for farm to 
shore investments are mainly national and economi-
cally unsound. Nonetheless, pioneering member 
states have already recognized that this is especially 
problematic offshore, and have started to experiment 
with fine-tuned frames. The models of Germany, the 
UK and Sweden are good examples of how the first, 
second, and third guiding principle of an economi-
cally sound frame can be implemented, respectively, 
but they are unsound from the perspective of at least 
one of the other principles (see Box 5). This is howev-
er not necessarily a problem from the perspective of 
EU objectives because the negative economic impact 
is mainly local. 
12. Note that some member states also apply deep connection cost 
charging, which implies that the generators also pay for the grid 
reinforcements that are sometimes needed in the existing grid 
when connecting a generator. For instance, Finland, Czech Re-
public and Luxembourg apply deep connection charging (Real-
isegrid, 2010). The debate shallow versus deep often comes down 
to where to put the border between the grid and the connection 
(Barth et al, 2008; Jamasb et al, 2005; Weißensteiner et al, 2011).
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3. Combined solutions 
Combined solutions are mixed farm to shore (con-
nection of offshore wind farms) and shore to shore 
(creation of interconnection capacity) investments. 
This type of offshore grid development is an alterna-
tive to standalone solutions and so it implies differ-
ent recommendations in terms of regulation and EU 
involvement. 
The chapter is structured in three sections: section 
3.1 gives an overview of combined solution projects, 
section 3.2 discusses the development of these proj-
Box 5: Summarizing the assessment of the regulatory frames for farm to shore investments
In Germany (DENA, 2011; TenneT, 2010): there is ad-
vanced connection planning (first principle: green); 
farm to shore investments are done by the TSOs, lack-
ing competition (second principle: red); and offshore 
wind generators do not pay for their connection (third 
principle: red).
In the UK (National Grid, 2010a; Ofgem, 2009, 2011a, 
2011b): there is no advanced connection planning, 
although the goal is to go in this direction by the 
coordination of the onshore TSO and the OFTO (first 
principle: orange); there is a competitive tender pro-
cess for farm to shore investments (second principle: 
green); and offshore generators pay for their connec-
tion (third principle: green). Note that the UK has su-
per shallow connection charging, but offshore wind 
farms anyway pay for their connection because the UK 
transmission tariff allocates part of the network costs 
to generators (there is a 30% so-called G-component), 
and for offshore generators this includes 100% of the 
cost of their connection to shore.
In Sweden (Swedish Gov., 1997): there is no advanced 
connection planning (first principle: red); but offshore 
wind developers build their own connection so that it 
is an activity open for competition (second principle: 
green); and developers also pay for their self-devel-
oped connection (third principle green). 
Note that the above assessment does not necessarily 
imply that the UK regime will be the best performing 
regime for two main reasons. First reason is that the 
relative importance of the principles remains to be 
seen, it could for instance be that the first principle 
is the most important one so that the German model 
could outperform the Swedish and UK model. Second 
reason is that we assess the regulatory frame for the 
connection of the offshore wind farms, while perfor-
mance will also depend on other factors, such as the 
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ects under the current regulatory frames, identifying 
the main difficulties and possible remedies, and sec-
tion 3.3 discusses how the EU could implement the 
possible remedies. 
3.1 Overview of combined solution 
projects
Our overview focuses on the three ongoing combined 
solution projects that have received EU funding from 
the European Economic Recovery Program for be-
ing first of a kind projects, i.e. Kriegers Flak (grant of 
150 M€), Cobra cable (grant of 86.5 M€), Moray Firth 
HVDC Hub (grant of 86.5 M€) (Figure 6).
Table 1 provides the basic characteristics for each of 
these three projects, i.e. the year they are expected to 
be commissioned, the countries involved, the total 
installed capacity of the offshore wind farms they are 
expected to connect, and the total amount of inter-
connection or bootstrap capacity that is expected to 
be created by the combined solution. 
In what follows, we further introduce the projects and 
discuss what is known and uncertain about their eco-
nomic case:
•	 Kriegers Flak is a project planned by the Danish 
TSO (Energinet.dk), a German TSO (50-Hertz), 
and the Swedish TSO (Svenska Kraftnätt). They 
studied a combined solution, involving the con-
nection of up to 1600 MW of offshore wind farms 
in Danish, German, and Swedish waters, with the 
creation of interconnection capacity (Energinet.
dk, 2009; E-Bridge, 2010; Jørgensen, 2011). The 
feasibility study argues that, in this specific case, 
there is a net gain, but the study did not demon-
strate that the net gain of this combined solution 
is superior to the net gain of a multiplication of 
standalone lines: “It is not within the scope of this 
Figure 6 – Kriegers Flak, Cobra cable, and Moray Firth
(based on Jørgensen, 2011; Van Dijk and Vilhelmsen, 2011; Neilson, 2011)
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pre-feasibility study to make detailed comparisons 
between a combined solution at Kriegers Flak and 
other ways of providing additional transmission ca-
pacity across the Baltic Sea.”
•	 Cobra cable is a project planned by the Dutch 
TSO (Tennet) and the Danish TSO (Energinet.dk) 
to interconnect Denmark with the Netherlands 
with a capacity of about 700 MW, with an option 
to also connect offshore wind farms at a second 
stage (TenneT, 2011; Van Dijk and Vilhelmsen, 
2011). OffshoreGrid (2011) studied the economic 
case of the Cobra cable between Denmark and the 
Netherlands. Teeing-in a German wind farms to 
the Cobra cable is identified as beneficial from the 
point of view of European welfare, i.e. the most 
interesting option that is suggested by this study 
is to add 1300 MW of offshore wind farms to the 
700 MW Cobra cable. The study is however not 
clear on how sensitive this positive result is to the 
significant cost and technology uncertainties that 
apply to these projects.
•	 Moray Firth HVDC Hub is a project planned by 
the Scottish TSO (SSE) to connect existing and 
planned offshore wind farms to shore (up to 2500 
MW), and simultaneously interconnect the on-
shore grid of the mainland in Scotland to the grid 
of the Shetland Islands (located in the North East 
of the country) (SSE, 2010; Neilson, 2011). The 
commissioning has recently been delayed from 
the previously stated 2013 to between 2015 and 
2018, which is an illustration of the level of uncer-
tainty in this type of projects.
Note finally that in existing HVDC systems, the whole 
infrastructure stops working if a fault occurs in one 
of its components. A more sophisticated operation of 
HVDC systems would require more advanced grid 
technology that has not yet been tested in practice, i.e. 
including hardware (e.g. HVDC circuit breakers) and 
software (e.g. HVDC control systems). In relatively 
small offshore grids, like the above discussed projects, 
it would still be manageable to shut down the entire 
grid to isolate a fault before reactivating part of it, so 
that combined solutions might already be opportune 
today. They may also become opportune on a wider 
scale in the future, but this will depend on how this 
advanced grid technology will develop.
To sum up, the projects that we analyzed in this sec-
tion have not yet demonstrated that there is an eco-
nomic case for combined solutions. In the case of 
Kriegers Flak and Moray Firth HVDC Hub we did 
not find such a demonstration in the public available 
Table 1: Combined solution project summary
Kriegers Flak Cobra cable Moray Firth HVDC Hub 
Year commissioned 
(expected) 2016 2016
Originally 2013, now 
expected for 2015-2018
Countries involved Denmark, Germany, Sweden Denmark, Netherlands UK
Interconnection capacity Only when the wind does not blow 700 MW To be determined
Bootstrap capacity No No To be determined
Offshore wind farm 
capacity up to 1600 MW Optional up to 2500 MW
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documentation. In the case of the Cobra Cable, there 
is a study that claims to have demonstrated the eco-
nomic case of this combined solution, but based on 
the publicly available documentation it is not possi-
ble to check the scientific robustness of this claim (see 
also Box 6). Furthermore, the economic case of larger 
scale combined solutions will depend on the develop-
ment of advanced grid hardware and software, such 
as HVDC circuit breakers, and HVDC control sys-
tems.
3.2 Developing combined solution 
projects under the current regulatory 
frames: difficulties and remedies
In this section, we discuss the development of these 
projects under the current regulatory frames to iden-
tify the main difficulties and possible remedies. We 
subsequently look at the national frames for trans-
mission investments, the national renewable support 
schemes, the multi-stakeholder setting, the required 
offshore grid technology development, and the se-
quential decision process that apply to these projects.
3.2.1 National frames for transmission invest-
ments
Not aligned national frames for transmission invest-
ments make it difficult for stakeholders to cooperate 
in the development of combined solutions. For in-
stance in the case of Kriegers Flak, the Danish and 
German TSOs are responsible for the interconnectors 
as well as for the connection of offshore wind farms 
in their waters, while the Swedish TSO is only re-
sponsible for interconnectors. In the case of Cobra, 
the Dutch and Danish TSOs might be able to con-
nect a German offshore wind cheaper than the Ger-
man TSO, but they are not responsible for it and the 
Box 6: OffshoreGrid (2011) study 
The study compares the cost-benefit of two modeling 
scenarios:
i) a direct offshore grid design which starts with shore 
to shore standalone investments and then allows 
combined solution; and
ii) a split offshore grid design which starts connecting 
wind farm hubs to create interconnection capacity. 
The study is based on a reference case that assumes 
that the interconnectors included in the ENTSO-E 
TYNDP will be implemented by 2020, and 126 GW of 
offshore wind will be connected by 2030.
The study projects promising net gains in the two sce-
narios that have been modeled starting from the pre-
viously mentioned reference case:
i) would generate benefits (reduction of generation 
costs) of €21 bn across a lifetime of 25 years, for a 
transmission investments cost of €7.4 bn;
ii) would generate benefits of €16 bn across a lifetime 
of 25 years, for a cost of €5.4 bn. 
But, it is not fully clear how sensitive these results are 
to the assumed generation mix for 2020 and 2030, 
and the evolution of the technology (e.g., HVDC com-
ponents availability and costs), etc, which are very un-
certain today.
Perhaps the announced study by ENTSO-E will be 
more conclusive. When announcing to study the eco-
nomic rationale to go towards combined solutions 
offshore, ENTSO-E said to expect that there might be 
opportunities, but mainly after 2020 (ENTSO-E, 2011).
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German TSO is obliged to connect. Moray Firth is a 
national project so that this difficulty does not apply 
to that project. Moreover, it is not even clear whether 
combined solutions will be considered as connections 
or interconnection or both under the current regula-
tory frames, while in most EU member states who is 
responsible and who pays depends on the answer to 
this question.
A promising remedy would be to harmonize the na-
tional frames towards the guiding principles of an 
economically sound regulatory frame for transmis-
sion investments (chapter 1 & 2). This is promising 
because it would imply that the planning responsi-
bilities of TSOs and regulators13 would then be more 
aligned than they are today (first principle). It would 
also imply having a Community-wide transmission 
and connection planning for offshore grids, includ-
ing combined solutions. Competitive tendering 
would then also be organized for the design and de-
velopment of the different parts of the combined so-
lutions (second principle). A joint tender could then 
be organized so that the winner of that tender would 
internalize the coordinated investment problem. Al-
ternatively, in cases where tenders for combined so-
lutions would be too expensive or cumbersome to 
organize, third parties (including the offshore wind 
farm developers) could be allowed to propose com-
bined solutions for a regulated return. Harmonizing 
into an economically sound regulatory frame would 
also imply that each offshore wind developer pays for 
its connection (third principle), so that they would be 
more cooperative in developing combined solutions 
to reduce the cost of their connection.
Note finally that besides not aligned stakeholder re-
13. Note that when we mention TSO involvement to implement 
the principles in the above paragraphs, this of course also implies 
each time that this involvement is regulated by the National Reg-
ulatory Authority; cooperation among TSOs then also requires 
cooperation among NRAs. It should not be that some TSOs 
would be regulated by governments offshore.
sponsibilities, also other rules and procedures can 
create distortions that need to be addressed. For in-
stance, this is the case for the rules defining the prior-
ity of connection and dispatch, the balancing charges 
and how offshore wind farms have to support balanc-
ing costs, etc. (see for instance E-Bridge, 2010). 
3.2.2 National renewable support schemes
Not aligned national renewable support schemes for 
offshore wind farms also make it difficult for stake-
holders to cooperate in the development of combined 
solutions. For instance in the case of Kriegers Flak, 
this is not necessarily an issue, but the current pro-
ject design only integrates three national solutions, 
whereby each country continues to import the off-
shore wind produced in its waters, which is not nec-
essarily the best design. In the Cobra case, the envis-
aged combined solution would imply that German 
offshore wind could feed into the Danish or Dutch 
system, rather than the German system, while the 
Germany renewable energy support is solely for en-
ergy delivered into the German system, and the Ger-
man TSO is responsible for marketing this energy. 
Moray Firth is a national project so that this difficulty 
does not apply to that project.
Therefore, as elaborated below, a promising remedy 
would be to harmonize renewable support schemes 
for offshore wind farms, or at least to improve their 
compatibility.14 
3.2.3 Multi-stakeholder setting 
Even if the regulatory frames and renewable support 
schemes would be harmonized, the development of 
combined solutions still requires cooperation be-
tween several stakeholders that do not necessarily 
14. See the ongoing CEER (2011) public consultation on the in-
compatibility issues of national renewable support schemes.
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benefit from this solution. For instance in the case of 
Kriegers Flak, three TSOs, three wind developers and 
three national regulatory authorities are involved. In 
the case of Cobra, this will be at least two TSOs and 
two regulators, and potentially several wind develop-
ers. Moray Firth involves only one TSO and regula-
tor, but potentially several wind developers. This 
multi-stakeholder setting is problematic because the 
distribution of benefits of offshore infrastructure is 
dispersed between many countries and between gen-
erators and consumers, with winners and losers that 
might need to be compensated. As studied in Egerer 
et al. (2011), this is especially the case for combined 
solutions.
A promising remedy (see below) would therefore be 
the facilitation of the ex-ante allocation of the costs 
and benefits of the investment (chapter 1). This will 
be necessary to implement the beneficiaries pay prin-
ciple for combined solutions, correcting the asym-
metry between costs and benefits of the stakeholders 
involved in developing these projects. 
3.2.4 Offshore grid technology development
The dependency on offshore grid technology de-
velopment further complicates combined solution 
projects because this development is hampered by 
the typical market failures that apply to RD&D (see 
THINK, 2011a). 
For instance, the technology to use in combined solu-
tions would typically be HVDC VSC, which is rela-
tively new technology that has already been used for 
standalone lines, but not yet in a combined solution. 
As mentioned previously, the combined solution sys-
tems require more advanced hardware and software 
that still need to be developed and tested. 
Therefore, as elaborated below, a promising remedy 
for the required offshore grid technology develop-
ment would then be to coordinate and speed-up their 
development. 
3.2.5 Sequential decision process
A final complication is that all the above difficulties 
have to be overcome in a context of uncertainty and 
irreversibility, while combined solutions are typically 
phased grid developments. 
For instance in the case of Kriegers Flak, the com-
plete international solution with all offshore wind 
turbines spinning, all modules of the grid connection 
in operation, and electricity being traded, is still some 
years in the future, while the first building blocks and 
the most important decisions to enable a combined 
solution are not that far away. The dimension of the 
offshore platform for the first wind farm, which is a 
significant cost factor in the total project, is referred 
to as one of these early decisions that precondition 
later developments as it would need to be oversized 
to be able to add equipment later. 
Besides the dimensions of offshore platforms, the 
irreversibility and incompatibility issues between 
HVDC technologies also include the cost of switch-
ing from CSC to VSC HVDC technology, the cost of 
combining HVDC systems that operate at a different 
voltage, the cost of retrofitting a converter station to 
make it multi-terminal, and possible costs caused by 
the incompatibility of for components coming from 
different manufacturers.
Therefore, as more elaborated below, a promising 
remedy could hence be to do more than only include 
offshore grid development in a Community-wide 
connection and transmission plan (see section 3.2.1). 
We also need to develop new transmission planning 
methods, for instance to capture the value of invest-
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ing today to create more options for possible incre-
mental offshore grid investments.
To sum up, combined solutions face tremendous 
difficulties under the current regulatory frames. As 
summarized in Box 7, the three projects we analyzed 
are confronted with most if not with all of these dif-
ficulties. With these frames, the offshore grid devel-
opment will be distorted towards a multiplication of 
standalone lines, even in cases where there would be 
clear economic case for combined solutions. How-
ever, we also identified remedies, which include: 1// 
harmonizing into economically sound regulatory 
frames for transmission investments; 2// harmoniz-
ing the renewable support schemes for offshore wind 
farms; 3// facilitating the required ex-ante investment 
cost benefit allocation; 4// speed-up offshore grid 
technology development; 5// adapt the Community-
wide transmission planning to offshore grids.
3.3 Possible role for the EU
In this section, we consider two types of EU inter-
vention to improve the currently mainly national 
regulatory frames for combined solutions, i.e. what 
we will refer to as a soft versus a stronger type of EU 
intervention. The soft type of EU intervention creates 
EU added value by guiding and supporting the ongo-
ing experimentation with novel regulatory frames at 
the national and regional level. The stronger type of 
EU intervention is then about strengthening the EU 
regulatory frame for combined solutions. 
For each of the remedies presented in the previ-
ous section, we consider in what follows whether it 
is enough to have a soft type of EU intervention, or 
whether the strong economic features (i.e. network 
externalities, cost and technology uncertainties, and 
economies of scale) of the investments demand a 
stronger EU intervention. Following the subsidiarity 
Box 7: Summarizing the assessment of which difficulties apply to which of the combined solution project
Note that, considering the below table, it is not sur-
prising that for instance in the case of Kriegers Flak, 
the initial project ambition has already been reduced: 
the Swedish TSO left the project (though being al-
lowed to anyway step into the join solution at a later 
stage), the German TSO could not wait with pursu-
ing a standalone solution for one of its offshore wind 
farms, and the Danish offshore wind development has 
been downscaled (Meeus and Saguan, 2011).
Difficulty Kriegers Flak Cobra Moray Firth
Misaligned national frames for 
transmission investments
Misaligned national renewable support 
schemes
Multi-stakeholder setting
Offshore grid technology development
Sequential decision process
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principle, the second type of EU intervention can in-
deed only be justified if the first type of EU interven-
tion would be problematic.
3.3.1 Harmonizing into economically sound 
regulatory frames for offshore transmission in-
vestments
To harmonize into economically sound regulatory 
frames for transmission investments, the first type of 
EU involvement would imply to do that on a volun-
tary basis. This is typically done by adopting indica-
tive guidelines at EU level. These guidelines could 
then encourage member states to fine-tune their reg-
ulatory frames according to the guiding principles of 
an economically sound frame, i.e. planning principle, 
competition principle, and beneficiaries pay principle 
(chapter 1 and 2). Regional Initiatives supported by 
the EU level is another commonly used approach to 
promote voluntary harmonization.
Contrarily, the second type of EU involvement would 
imply to impose legally binding guidelines right away. 
Then, the EU could gradually enforce a EU level tar-
get model for the regulatory framework applied to 
transmission investments.
Due to the strong cost and technology uncertainties 
of combined solution projects, their economic case 
is still uncertain, especially for larger scale projects. 
This implies that harmonization is currently mainly 
required regionally. For instance, it is not really nec-
essary to already harmonize the frames of the North 
Seas countries in the same way as the Mediterranean 
Sea countries. Moreover, experimentation with novel 
regulatory frames at the national level has only just 
started so a strong EU intervention risks to prema-
turely stop the regulatory process of investigation and 
discovery of what works and what not. Therefore, the 
soft type of EU intervention that guides and supports 
regionalized solutions seems to be the most appropri-
ate approach for the implementation of this remedy.
3.3.2 Harmonizing the renewable support 
schemes for offshore wind farms 
A soft intervention at the EU level to prompt the har-
monization of the renewable support schemes would 
be to promote the voluntary use of existing flexibil-
ity mechanisms (i.e. joint project and joint support 
scheme mechanisms) for offshore wind farms. This 
would help to reduce the distortions coming from the 
national schemes (EU, 2009; Klessmann et al., 2010; 
Ahner, 2011; Ragwitz, 2010; CEER, 2011). Indeed, 
the joint project mechanism, e.g., allows member 
states to deviate from their default renewable energy 
support scheme, and to cooperate to give tailor made 
support to a project.15 Differently, the joint support 
scheme mechanism allows member states to join or 
coordinate their national support schemes, which 
requires a stronger commitment from the countries 
involved. 
An implementation of the second type of EU involve-
ment would be to harmonize renewable support 
schemes at EU level, which could include the intro-
duction of an EU support scheme. Such intervention 
has been frequently discussed as a promising action; 
however, it has proven to be controversial both aca-
demically and politically (THINK, 2011b).
Due to the regional scope of current combined so-
lutions projects, the same rationale applies as in the 
previous section. A harmonization at national or 
regional level (depending on the projects) not only 
gives an opportunity to regulatory experimentation at 
15. For instance in the case of Kriegers Flak, it would imply that 
the Danish, Swedish, and German wind farms in that area could 
be developed as a single renewable energy project. The support 
could be allocated via tender to a developer who would then in-
ternalize the coordination between the different wind farm devel-
opments (see also section 3.3.1).
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this level, but also avoids the difficulties of the imple-
mentation of a EU-wide support scheme. Therefore, 
the soft type of EU intervention to support regional-
ized solutions seems to be also the most appropriate 
approach for the implementation of this remedy for 
combined solutions.
3.3.3 Facilitating the ex-ante allocation of 
costs and benefits of offshore transmission in-
vestments
The first type of EU involvement to facilitate a proper 
cost benefit allocation would imply to facilitate re-
gional arrangements for combined solution projects 
rather than the bilateral agreements that are typically 
made today for transmission expansion investments 
across borders, as in the case of NorNed. Then, the 
evaluation of costs and benefits would also be done 
regionally, among the different member states in-
volved in the project.  
Differently, the second type of EU involvement would 
imply the design of an EU mechanism for investment 
cost and benefits allocation, as well as to adopt an EU 
approach to packaging projects. Packaging is about 
approving a bundle of projects that individually make 
sense cost benefit wise, but would result in winners 
and losers among member states, while in aggrega-
tion they avoid that there are losers. 
Despite the regional scope of existing combined so-
lution projects, the network externalities and econo-
mies of scale of these projects are such that their im-
pact is typically European. Moreover, even for smaller 
projects with a regional impact, the relevant region 
can be project dependent, so that the EU approach 
could include the identification of the relevant region 
to then partly regionalize the ex-ante investment cost 
and benefit allocation. Hence, the strong type of EU 
involvement is advisable for the implementation of 
this remedy, keeping in mind that it could be comple-
mented by partly regionalized solutions.
3.3.4 Speeding-up offshore grid technology 
development 
The first type of EU involvement to accelerate the 
development of offshore grid technology would be 
to continue to rely on member states to strategically 
identify the research, development and demonstra-
tion activities that are needed and to give them prior-
ity, and to provide EU funding to fill the gaps.
A stronger EU intervention is what is already ongo-
ing with the Strategic Energy Technology (SET) Plan, 
whereby an EU process is introduced to prioritize re-
search, development and demonstration actions for 
technologies that are considered strategic to achieve 
the EU policy objectives. This would then imply to 
include offshore grid development in the SET-Plan, 
which would result in setting up an industrial ini-
tiative that would draft and implement a technol-
ogy roadmap. The main goal would be to speed-up 
offshore grid technology development required for 
large-scale combined solutions (larger than Kriegers 
Flak, Cobra, and Moray Firth). 
Currently, the SET-Plan already has a technology 
roadmap made by wind manufacturers and another 
one developed by TSOs (Lemmens, 2010), including 
some research and demonstration activities on off-
shore grids (Constantinescu, 2011). However, there is 
no roadmap performed by HVDC manufacturers, fo-
cusing specifically on offshore grid technology devel-
opment. Such a roadmap could, for instance, facilitate 
the development of standards to ensure interoperabil-
ity between components of different manufacturers,16 
16. Note that there is an ongoing discussion at international level 
regarding HVDC technology standards that could already partly 
address this issue. For instance, the CIGRE Study Committee B4 
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which is not probable to happen by only providing 
grants to specific projects. Moreover, the roadmap 
would also facilitate a better allocation of EU fund-
ing.17 Therefore a stronger type of EU involvement 
seems to be the most appropriate approach for the 
implementation of this remedy.
3.3.5 Adapting the Community-wide trans-
mission planning to offshore grids
A soft EU intervention to adapt transmission plan-
ning to offshore grids could be to provide funding for 
the development of improved transmission planning 
methods,18 with indicative guidelines on how to use 
them in national planning. This would lead to more 
harmonized planning across member states, as the 
approaches would slowly converge.
Otherwise, the second type of EU involvement could 
be implemented by extending the current Com-
munity-wide Ten Year Network Development Plan 
(TYNDP) into a Twenty/Thirty year plan with man-
datory use of improved transmission planning meth-
ods. The extension of the plan’s horizon is very im-
portant in the sense that the potential opportunities 
for combined solutions are mainly beyond 2020, and 
so are currently not included in the Community-wide 
transmission planning.
HVDC and power electronics and the CENELEC CLC TC 8X 
Working Group are working on that.
17. Note that combined solution projects from our overview re-
ceived EU funding from the European Economic Recovery Pro-
gram for being first of a kind projects, i.e. Kriegers Flak (grant 
of 150 M€), Cobra cable (grant of 86.5 M€), Moray Firth HVDC 
Hub (grant of 86.5 M€) (Figure 6). However, it would have been 
more opportune to organize a competitive tender for combined 
solution projects (see THINK, 2011a). 
18. The FP7 Call on Electricity Highways (area ENER-
GY.2012.7.2-1) with the ENTSO-E response to set up a Consor-
tium to work towards a Modular Development Plan on pan-Eu-
ropean Electricity Highways System 2050 (MoDPEHS) is a good 
example of this.
Considering that network externalities and econo-
mies of scale of combined solution projects are such 
that the impact is typically European, it is important 
to optimize their planning from an EU perspective, 
instead of optimizing benefits nationally or region-
ally. Moreover, even if common guidelines could help 
to harmonize transmission planning methodologies 
across member states, the prioritization of national 
welfare would still prevail. Therefore, a stronger EU 
intervention is recommended to implement this rem-
edy.
4. Recommendations
The analysis in this report shows that the added value 
of additional EU policy actions for offshore grids de-
pends on whether the offshore grid will develop as 
a multiplication of standalone lines or whether there 
will be a transition towards combined solutions. 
Therefore, we provide recommendations for stan-
dalone lines and combined solutions separately in 
what follows. 
4.1 Standalone lines
The current mainly national regulatory frames for 
offshore transmission investments are economically 
unsound. However, this does not represent a great 
challenge from the EU perspective for two reasons: 
first, unsound farm to shore regulatory frames do 
not hinder the achievement of the EU objectives; 
and second, even if the current situation for shore to 
shore investments can hamper the achievement of EU 
objectives, the problem is similar to onshore trans-
mission expansion investments. So, for both types of 
investments, there is no need for a specific EU inter-
vention for offshore grids. Nonetheless, we consider 
that, regarding standalone lines, it is important to 
continue the following policy actions that are ongo-
ing for grids, onshore as well as offshore:
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1. It is important to continue the implementation of 
the third package, comprising a Community-wide 
transmission planning that already includes shore 
to shore investments. Additionally, it is worth 
mentioning that this still needs to be backed-up by 
an EU level facilitation of the ex-ante investment 
cost and benefit allocation, as proposed by the in-
frastructure package. 
2. It is important to continue the experimentation 
with novel regulatory frames (e.g. Germany, UK 
and Sweden) that have been fine-tuned for the 
connection of offshore wind farms. Note that, even 
if the currently imperfect fine tuning is not a prob-
lem from the EU perspective, the EU could add 
value by supporting this learning process, for in-
stance, by benchmarking existing practices.
4.2 Combined solutions
From the analysis on combined solutions’ projects, it 
is evident that, without additional EU intervention, 
future offshore grid developments will be distorted 
towards a multiplication of standalone lines. Thus, 
taking into account that small-scale combined solu-
tions (e.g. Kriegers Flak, Cobra, and Moray Firth) can 
already be opportune today and larger scale solutions 
might also become opportune in the future, regula-
tory action is needed. 
The least regret EU policy strategy would then be 
to implement remedies for the tremendous difficul-
ties faced by combined solutions, while also giving a 
chance to the ongoing regional initiatives. So, where 
opportune, the EU should opt for a soft intervention, 
guiding and supporting the national and/or regional 
policy implementation of the remedies; and, where a 
regional solution is not viable, a stronger EU involve-
ment is already recommended today. This then leads 
to the following recommendations for initiatives to 
be taken by the European Commission, in addition 
to the third package and the infrastructure package 
proposal:
1. Harmonizing into economically sound regula-
tory frames for offshore transmission invest-
ments: by providing indicative guidelines that 
encourage member states to follow the guiding 
principles of an economically sound regulatory 
frame (i.e. planning principle, competition prin-
ciple, and beneficiaries pay principle) to reduce 
the distortions coming from the national frames 
(i.e., soft type of EU involvement, supporting re-
gionalized solutions).
2. Harmonizing the renewable support schemes 
for offshore wind farms: by promoting the 
use of the renewable support scheme flexibility 
mechanisms for offshore wind farms (i.e. joint 
project and joint support scheme mechanism) to 
reduce the distortions coming from the national 
schemes (i.e., soft type of EU involvement, sup-
porting regionalized solutions).
3. Facilitating the ex-ante allocation of costs and 
benefits of offshore transmission investments: 
by organizing the approval of transmission in-
vestment project packages, complemented with a 
new mechanism to implement the beneficiaries 
pay principle for combined solutions (i.e., strong 
type of EU involvement that could be complement-
ed by partly regionalized solutions).
4. Speeding-up offshore grid technology develop-
ment: through the inclusion of an offshore grid 
technology roadmap in the SET-Plan, within an 
industrial initiative driven by HVDC manufac-
turers, focused on the speed-up of offshore grid 
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technology development required for large scale 
combined solutions (larger than Kriegers Flak, 
Cobra, and Moray Firth). (i.e., strong type of EU 
involvement).
5. Adapting the Community-wide transmis-
sion planning to offshore grids: by developing 
improved transmission planning methodolo-
gies and applying them to elaborate a Twenty or 
Thirty Year Network Development Plan that con-
siders combined solutions (i.e., strong type of EU 
involvement).
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Annexes
Annex 1: Overview of offshore grid visions
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Annex 2: Economic and technology fea-
tures of offshore infrastructures
Main sources: This annex is based on ABB (2011), 
Alegria et al (2009), Beerten et al. (2010), Beerten 
et al. (2011), Buijs et al (2011), Cole and Belmans 
(2009),  Belmans (2010), Cigre (2010), Europac-
able (2011), Ergun et al. (2011), Green and Vasilakos 
(2011), Hertem and Ghandhari (2010), Lumbreras 
and Ramos (2010a, 2010b), National Grid (2010b), 
RealiseGrid (2010). 
A2.1: Offshore transmission systems
There are three main technological alternatives that 
can be used for offshore electricity transmission, 
namely:
 – High Voltage Alternating Current (HVAC) 
transmission systems that are commonly used in 
onshore transmission grids, and also offshore to 
connect offshore wind farms to shore
 – Current Source Converter High Voltage Direct 
Current (CSC HVDC) transmission systems, also 
called as conventional HVDC, that have been 
used for offshore interconnectors since the 1950s;
- Voltage Source Converter High Voltage Direct 
Current (VSC HVDC) transmission systems are 
relatively new that started to be used in the late 
1990s.19
Figure A2.1 is a simplified comparison of the two 
systems, distinguishing between the required substa-
tions and cabling. 
 – First observation is that HVDC systems require a 
larger substation than HVAC systems because the 
existing grid to which they connect is based on Al-
ternating Current (AC), so that they need to con-
vert AC into Direct Current (DC), and then con-
vert this DC back into AC at the end of the cable. 
 – Second observation is that HVDC VSC require 
smaller substations than HVDC CSC systems be-
cause the converter stations have a smaller foot-
19. Indeed, there are only two manufacturers that offer these sys-
tems nowadays: ABB (HVDC light) and Siemens (HVDC plus).
Figure A2.1 – Schematic representation of different transmission systems
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print, e.g. the typical dimensions of a 1000 MW 
CSC converter station located onshore are of the 
order of 200m x 175m x 22m while this is only 
90m x 54m x 24m for a VSC converter station of 
the same scale, i.e. an installation that is larger 
than two football fields versus a barn size instal-
lation. 
 – Third observation is that HVAC systems require 
more cable (due to the high capacitance of the ca-
bles) than the HVDC systems, and VSC HVDC 
requires less cabling than CSC HVDC systems.
A2.2: Offshore transmission connections
Table A2.2 summarizes the suitability of different 
transmission systems for the types of standalone in-
vestments. Note that especially VSC HVDC is a rela-
tively new technology so that the below table is based 
on today’s relative costs, which can change as these 
technologies develop. 
 – The first observation is that CSC HVDC systems 
are not suitable for farm to shore investments be-
cause the footprint of the converter stations is too 
large. HVAC systems are the most suitable op-
tion for short distance farm to shore investments 
because they typically are the cheapest solution, 
even though VSC HVDC can be more suitable in 
specific cases where some of the technical advan-
tages of these systems over HVAC matter. HVAC 
systems are however not suitable for long distance 
farm to shore investments due to the limited cable 
length of AC systems, a limitation that does not 
apply to VSC HVDC so that for longer distances 
this transmission system becomes the most suit-
able option. 
 – The second observation is that HVAC systems 
are most suitable option for short distance shore 
to shore investments because they typically are 
the cheapest solution, but they are not suitable for 
Table A2.2 – Suitability of different transmission systems for the types of standalone investments








Short distance Most suitable option
Large footprint of converter 
stations not suitable for 
offshore
Can be more suitable in specific 
cases
Long distance Limited cable length
Large footprint of converter 











Short distance Most suitable option within a synchronous zone
Most suitable option between 
synchronous zone
Can be more suitable in specific 
cases
Long Distance Limited cable length Most suitable option Can be more suitable in specific cases
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longer distances because of the limited cable length 
of AC systems, and they are also not suitable to be 
used between different synchronous zones. CSC 
HVDC is therefore the most suitable system to be 
used between synchronous zones, and definitely if 
larger distances are concerned. VSC HVDC sys-
tems can be more suitable in specific cases where 
some of the technical advantages of these systems 
over HVAC and CSC HVDC matter.
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Annex 3: Overview shore to shore standalone lines
Main sources: HVDC list from Cigre with complementary information from TSOs and companies responsible by the 
construction (ABB, Siemens, etc), ENTSOe map of existing transmission line.






Distance (km) Power (MW) Voltage (kV) Transmission 
technology
1 Konti-Skan 1 Denmark, Swe-den 1964 87 250 250 HVDC CSC
2 Konti-Skan 2 Denmark, Swe-den 1988 87 300 285 HVDC CSC
3 SACOI 1 Italy, france 1965 385 300 200 HVDC CSC
4 SACOI 2 Italy, France 1992 385 300 200 HVDC CSC
5 Cross-Skagerak 1 and 2
Denmark, 
Norway 1977 130 275 250 HVDC CSC
6 Cross-Skagerak 3 Denmark, Norway 1993 130 500 350 HVDC CSC
7 Gotland 2 Sweden 1983 93 130 150 HVDC CSC
8 Gotland 3 Sweden 1987 98 130 150 HVDC CSC
9 Cross-Channel (new) France, UK 1986 72 2000 270 HVDC CSC
10 Fenno-Skan Finland, Sweden 1989 233 550 400 HVDC CSC
11 Fenno-Skan 2 Finland, Sweden 2011 200 800 500 HVDC CSC
12 Baltic Cable Germany, Swe-den 1994 262 600 450 HVDC CSC
13 Kontek Denmark, Ger-many 1996 170 600 400 HVDC CSC
14 SwePol Poland, Sweden 2000 245 600 450 HVDC CSC
15 Italy - Greece (GRITA) Greece, Italy 2001 313 500 400 HVDC CSC
16 Moyle UK 2001 63.5 250 250 HVDC CSC
17 NorNed Netherlands, Norway 2008 580 700 450 HVDC CSC
18 SAPEI Italy 2009 440 500 500 HVDC CSC
19 BritNed Netherlands, UK 2011 260 1000 400 HVDC CSC
20 StoreBaelt Denmark 2010 56 600 400 HVDC CSC
21 Cometa (HVDC) Spain 2011 247 400 250 HVDC CSC
22 HVDC NordBalt Lituania, Sweden 2015 450 700 300 HVDC VSC
23 Estlink Estonia, Finland 2006 105 350 150 HVDC VSC
24 East-West Inter-connector UK 2012 261 500 200 HVDC VSC
25 Spain-Morocco Interconnector 1 Spain, Morocco 1997 28 700 400 HVAC
26 Spain-Morocco Interconnector 2 Spain, Morocco 2006 28 700 400 HVAC
27 MEA Isle of Man – UK Mainland link UK 2000 105 65 90 HVAC
28
Mainland Swe-




mark 2005 15 60 60 HVAC
29 Nemo Belgium, UK 2016 150 1000 250 HVDC CSC
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Annex 4: Overview farm to shore standalone lines
Main sources: http://www.lorc.dk/Knowledge/Offshore-renewables-map/Offshore-wind-farms; and own analysis 
of official websites offshore wind farms






Power (MW) Voltage (kV) Transmission 
technology
1 Arklow Bank 1 Ireland 2003 10 25.2 25 MVAC
2 Beatrice UK 2007 23 10 33 MVAC
3 Blyth UK 2000 1.6 4 11 MVAC
4 Burbo Bank UK 2007 6.4 90 33 MVAC
5 Egmond aan Zee Netherlands 2006 14 108 34 MVAC
6 Hooksiel Germany 2008 0.4 5 20 MVAC
7 Hywind Norway 2009 10 2.3 22 MVAC
8 Inner Dowsing UK 2009 5.9 97.2 33 MVAC
9 Kemi Ajos Finland 2008 2.6 30 20 MVAC
10 Kentish Flats 1 UK 2005 10.75 90 33 MVAC
11 Lynn UK 2009 5.9 97.2 33 MVAC
12 Middelgrunden Denmark 2000 1 40 30 MVAC
13 North Hoyle UK 2004 7.2 60 33 MVAC
14 Paludans Flak Denmark 2003 3.5 23 30 MVAC
15 Rhyl Flats UK 2009 8 90 33 MVAC
16 Scroby Sands UK 2004 2.3 60 33 MVAC
17 Sprogoe Denmark 2009 10.6 21 10 MVAC
18 Utgrunden Sweden 2000 8 10.5 21 MVAC
19 Vindeby Denmark 1991 2.25 4.95 10 MVAC
20 Yttre Stengrund Sweden 2001 4 10 20 MVAC
21 Alpha Ventus Germany 2010 52.5 60 110 HVAC
22 Baltic 1 Germany 2010 16 48.3 150 HVAC
23 Barrow UK 2008 7.5 90 132 HVAC
24 Belwind Belgium 2010 46 165 150 HVAC
25 Greater Gabbard UK 2008 26 504 132 HVAC
26 Gunfleet Sands UK 2010 7 172.8 132 HVAC
27 Horns Rev 1 Denmark 2002 17 160 150 HVAC
28 Horns Rev 2 Denmark 2009 30 209.3 150 HVAC
29 Lillgrund Sweden 2007 7 110.4 130 HVAC
30 Nysted 1 Denmark 2003 10.8 165.6 132 HVAC
31 Princess Amalia Netherlands 2008 23 120 150 HVAC
32 Robin Rigg UK 2010 8 180 132 HVAC
33 Roedsand 2 Denmark 2010 8.8 207 132 HVAC
34 Thanet UK 2010 11.4 300 132 HVAC
35 Thornton Bank 1 Belgium 2009 28.7 30 150 HVAC
36 Walney 1 UK 2011 14.4 183.6 132 HVAC
37 Avedore Holme Denmark 2009 0.05 7.2 - -
http://think.eui.eu48
Final Report - January 2012
38 Bockstigen Sweden 1998 3 2.5 - -
39 Breitling Germany 2006 0.5 2.5 - -
40 Ems Emden Germany 2004 0.6 4.5 - -
41 Frederikshavn Denmark 2003 1 7.6 - -
42 Irene Vorrink Netherlands 1997 30 16.8 - -
43 Lely Netherlands 1994 0.8 2 - -
44 Pori 1 Finland 2010 1.2 2.3 - -
45 Roenland Denmark 2002 0.15 17.2 - -
46 Tunoe Knob Denmark 1995 6 5 - -
47 Vanern Sweden 2009 7 30 - -
48 HVDC BorWin 1 Germany 2009 200 400 150 HVDC VSC
49 HVDC BorWin 2 Germany 2012 200 800 HVDC VSC
50 HVDC DolWin 1 Germany 2013 330 800 320 HVDC VSC
51 HVDC HelWin 1 Germany 2013 130 576 380 HVDC VSC
52 HVDC SylWin 1 Germany 2014 205 864 HVDC VSC
53 Tjaereborg Denmark 2000 4.3 7 9 HVDC VSC
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Annex 5: Conclusions of Industrial Coun-
cil Meeting (based on report version 
“V0”, Sept. 2011)
Serge Galant
Technofi // Submission date: September 15, 2011 
Introduction
The initial title of the draft slide presentation (“Off-
shore grids: towards a least regret EU policy”) has 
been progressively evolving as the meeting got into 
in-depth discussions. It is proposed to change the title 
in view of addressing the question summarized be-
low.
The question
The massive deployment of off-shore wind power 
comes from the reluctance from the general public to 
deploy on-shore wind generation and the large wind 
resource available off-shore in many areas of Europe 
(with an emphasis on the North Sea).
Although there are plans to off-shore install electric-
ity intensive industries (aluminum or steel produc-
tion), the most attractive use of off-shore wind power 
remains the transportation towards high consump-
tion areas, where CO2 free production would match 
the 2020 European commitments and the foreseen 
2050 decarbonised electricity production picture.
The question to be answered by the THINK consor-
tium is therefore:
“Do we need a collective, EU-based vision and tentative 
transition paths to reach a Transmission Grid suited to 
deliver off-shore wind power on-shore”?
The answer is probably yes, since:
 – It is still a green field with major risk allocation 
changes so far on many features (distance, legal, 
regulatory, tools to plan and operate the intercon-
nected systems, some technology and emergency 
operation issues for a future meshed DC subma-
rine grid,….) 
 – It involves several EU MS and others (Norway, Af-
rican countries)
 – The investment coverage raises issues for the next 
thirty years, including the cost of system innova-
tion required to detail the investments 
 – Successful solutions may make European industry 
a world leader (technology manufacturing, plan-
ning and operating of a meshed submarine net-
work) 
The tentative answer do the question
The positive answer to the above questions comes 
from several considerations:
 – Major risk allocation changes need to be address, 
which have a European dimension, and have not 
been addressed so far properly:
•	 the legal and regulatory framework with 
power plants possibly located outside the 
national territorial zones,
•	 the development of planning and operation 
tools of the resulting grid where close in-
teractions and coordination between TSOs 
will be a must,
•	 emergency operations, especially for a 
submarine, HVDC possibly meshed grid 
will require both technologies (like circuit 
breakers) and operational modes that still 
need intensive testing. 
•	 Politically, it will involve more interdepend-
ence between Member States of EU27, but 
also between Europe and Norway, Switzer-
land, but also North African States.
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 – The huge investments to build the transmission 
grid raises financing questions at a time where Eu-
rope tries to find new areas of sustainable growth, 
and public bodies are short of investment capaci-
ties. The financing issues cover innovation, dem-
onstration, industrialisation and deployment costs 
with different risk profiles,
 – The successful completion of such a transmis-
sion grid would make Europe a world leader:
•	 on technology manufacturing grounds,
•	 on power system operations.
since dealing with a submarine, large scale, HVDC 
grid.
Clarity: what is still fuzzy in the first draft study?
A detailed analysis of the differences between on-
shore and off-shore transmission grids expansion 
due to wind power generation must be presented, 
showing what are the areas of new knowledge that are 
still needed to complete a full of-shore transmission 
grid, and the subsequent needs of EU involvement. 
The time horizon for the proposal of EU involvement 
must be given with a clear need to go beyond 2020. 
There is a necessity for a complementary regulatory 
framework at EU level which bridges the gap between 
the Third Energy Package and the Renewable Direc-
tive.
There are several EU organizations and several EU 
instruments that can be involved in setting the vision 
and detailing the transmission paths. For instance:
 – the European Commission via DG Research (on-
going call for proposals), DG Energy (a new regu-
latory framework), DG Competition (the relation-
ship between regulated and non-regulated players, 
the legal implications of several business models), 
DG Regio (for the funding of infrastructures),
 – the European Parliament in the construction of 
Directives,
 – the Council in setting interdependence rules on a 
political basis,
 – ACER in the enforcement of existing and future 
regulations based on an increased cooperation be-
tween national regulations.
Please detail the ones, which are the most important, 
the involved instruments and the implied governance 
issues.
Among the transition paths, the split between an ISO 
model and a TSO model has been mentioned for the 
off-shore grid. 
Finally, EC representatives have underlined several 
issues, which can be properly addressed when clarify-
ing:
 – the proposed transition paths which could lead to 
long term scenarios with increased coordination 
between Member States coordinated / interde-
pendent paths must be mentioned,
 – there is an “egg and chicken issue” where TSOs 
expect manufacturers to provide field proven so-
lutions and manufacturers expect TSO to provide 
detailed specifications and funding to perform de-
velopment activities. It was suggested to amplify 
public funding for RD & D projects where TSOs 
can demonstrate the costs and benefits of innova-
tive critical technology components (the circuit 
breaker for HVDC meshed lines was mentioned 
at length). This is another example of public inter-
vention needed at EU level with a first example in 
an on -going contract entitled TWENTIES.
 – the type of governance which must be implement-
ed to perform such large scale RD and D projects
 – the role of electricity storage as a future key tech-
nology which deserves attention at EU level (for 
RD and D, regulations and investment policies)
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 – the needs for interlinking technology develop-
ment, regulation development and long term co-
ordinated policies.
Completeness: what are the missing topics to be 
included
There are four main areas of improvement:
 – for the technology scope:
•	 AC links are also candidates when com-
pared to DC links,
•	 Critical technologies for future networks 
(DC breakers, short circuit current surges),
•	 On-shore network reinforcements induced 
by off-shore power production,
•	 Critical bottlenecks in technology manu-
facturing (for instance cables).
 – for the market scope:
•	 the Mediterranean grid,
•	 the time to market of technologies (taking 
into account the costs of large scale system 
demonstrations required before system de-
ployment),
•	 standardisation of grid configurations / 
components
•	 interoperability of critical technology com-
ponents
•	 innovative regulatory frameworks based on 
a learning by doing implementation
•	 linking with Report N°1 of THINK (inno-
vation funding)
Coherence
There are some incoherencies (or fuzzy elements) 
which deserve some attention:
 – the tentative transition must indeed take into ac-
count the planning of future investments, but also 
more and more coordinated operations 
 – the initial question raised (do we need a collective 
EU-based vision and tentative transition path to 
reach a Transmission Grid suited to deliver off-
shore wind power on-shore?) come from a poten-
tial market failure:
•	 ambitious energy policy at EU level (2020 
and 2050) impact everyone in Europe,
•	 but the interdependence consequences are 
still minimised if not overlooked,
•	 there is a potential market failure where the 
interdependence at transmission level will 
not be solved unless major investments and 
changes of operational modes (more co-
ordination) are implemented by 2020 and 
much before 2050,
•	 addressing this market failure requires sys-
tem innovation for the grid for which the 
costs are not yet covered between 2012 and 
2020 (FP8), even if the Third Energy Pack-
age has made provisions to use the tariffs 
for such funding
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Annex 6: Conclusions of Project Advisors 
(based on report version “V1”, Oct. 2011)
Nils-Henrik von der Fehr
Professor at Department of Economics, University of 
Oslo // Submission date: October 30, 2011 
My comments are based on the first draft of the re-
port dated October 2011, as presented at the meeting 
of the Scientific Council in Brussels on October 18-
19, 2011.
Introduction
The aim of the report is to formulate policy recom-
mendations for the European Commission (DG 
Energy) on offshore grids in light of EU energy and 
environmental objectives. The analysis considers two 
broad questions: (i) to what extent offshore grids dif-
fer from onshore grids and (ii) whether there is a 
rationale for building grids offshore rather than on-
shore. The main conclusion is that the EU should 
adopt what is termed a “least regret policy”.
Overall assessment
Overall, the analysis is reasonable and the questions 
posed are satisfactorily answered. Specifically, the 
conclusion that offshore grids do not involve quali-
tatively new issues relative to onshore grids is well 
taken. Also, there seems to be little need for specific 
measures to promote offshore grids. In short, offshore 
elements should be viewed as an integrated part of 
the electricity transmission grid in Europe and regu-
lated accordingly.
The main problems with the report as it now stands 
is that the arguments are not always entirely clear and 
that it contains material that seems to be of little rel-
evance for the issues at hand.
Other comments
While offshore and onshore grids are, from a regu-
latory point of view, essentially the same, certain 
offshore grid projects could present regulatory chal-
lenges in a particularly acute form, due to their large 
scale, the use of novel technology and involvement of 
multiple national jurisdictions. 
While this is certainly true, the question is to what 
extent this is a real problem. For example, the fact that 
new technology is involved cannot automatically be 
taken as a sign that there may be a market failure, as 
the report seems to suggest (p 34).
Furthermore, even if such challenges were real, it is 
not clear that they could not be handled under cur-
rent regulations and without the involvement of EU 
level authorities. Indeed, in the examples considered 
in the report, it does not become clear whether the 
success, or lack of such, of these project can be related 
to characteristics of the current regulatory regime.
Much of the discussion therefore becomes rather 
general, on the pros and cons of various regulatory 
regimes for transmission networks. While such a 
discussion may be of value in itself, the reasoning 
sometimes becomes rather vague or superficial, such 
as when the report advocates “more planning” and 
“more TSO involvement”, that “each actor should be 
properly incentivized” and that “offshore wind farms 
should pay to some extent for their connection” (p 
13). It is also not obvious what “a tailored regulatory 
frame that is economically sound” (p 23) really is. 
Indeed, the term “least regret policy” remains some-
thing of a mystery.
Also, the analytical method applied, which tends to 
see different aspects of the regulatory regime in isola-
tion, makes it difficult to evaluate the totality of dif-
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ferent regulatory regimes; in particular, an apparent 
weakness along one dimension may be counteracted 
by strengths along other dimensions. The usefulness 
of comparisons such as those in Box 3 is therefore 
somewhat doubtful.
In Section 3.1, the report presents various scenarios 
for the future of the European transmission grid. 
Some of these scenarios are, at best, hypothetical and 
speculative, based on wishful thinking and seem to 
provide little insight into the real challenges and like-
ly development of the European electricity industry. 
This material could be cut, or at least substantially 
reduced.
Dörte Fouquet
Lawyer, Partner at Becker Büttner Held // Submission 
date: October 30, 2011 
General comments
The report on offshore grids is a good start and shows 
quite some effort. 
However, the text needs to be updated regarding re-
cently published studies discussing offshore grids, 
including the latest “Offshore Grids” study (October 
2011) and the “Plan N”. (The report cites to the 2010 
version of the Offshore Grids study). Also, closer at-
tention should be paid to the National Renewable En-
ergy Action Plans. 
Overall, the report could be more precise and could 
provide more contexts. Often for example, it is re-
ferred to “Member States”, but without indicating 
which Member States or mentioning examples, or 
explanations are lacking where they would be need-
ed to support a debatable statement (e.g. that „non-
harmonized national frames are a problem“ from EU 
internal market perspective). 
Conceptual comments: 
The concept of “least regret policy” needs more ex-
planations. As this is the central point of the paper, 
it should be clearly defined what is meant from the 
very beginning. This should be done in the introduc-
tion, when the objective of the report is mentioned. 
It would make sense to explain what is at stake, why 
a change is needed and what is aimed for with the 
development of a “least regret policy”. 
Then the discussion of (priority) access and trans-
mission rights for renewable energies needs to be 
corrected and improved.  One should consider ex-
plaining the concepts first and how they fit into the 
context of the Renewable Energy Directive 2009/28/
EC rather than first mentioning them under the label 
of “implicit subsidy”. The report seems to suggest that 
a system in which renewable energy producers do 
not have to pay connection and transmission costs is 
not to be preferred and in particular the German sys-
tem is blamed for “socializing costs”. However, there 
is insufficient context provided and the argumenta-
tion on this point seems rather one-sided and even a 
bit judgmental. Explanations of the benefits of such a 
system or of the reasons behind (e.g. how it fits into 
the German system) it would improve the quality of 
the argumentation either way. 
Then the case studies are flawed by comparing a na-
tional project with international projects. Certainly, 
administration in only one country is easier than in 
several different Member States. Also, they appear 
quite incomplete, as not for all cases the same infor-
mation is given. More information should be pro-
vided on each of them and it should be organized in 
a more structured way, so that the reader can easily 
compare them and understand the evaluation con-
clusions.
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The use of the “smileys” - and in addition to the fact 
that the table is incorrect due to the comparison of a 
national project – should be reconsidered. There are 
preferable ways of presenting results which allow for 
better differentiation and are thus closer to the facts.
Comments on content: 
The offshore targets mentioned in the introduction 
are very imprecise, ranging from 2 to 15% of the total 
generation capacity by 2050. This could be narrowed 
so as to better reflect recent Member States’ estimates, 
such as by the German Federal Ministry for the En-
vironment. 
Further, the section on the impact of grid extension 
on the cost of renewable electricity should be more 
detailed to complete the picture. The one paragraph 
with reference to another work seems insufficient on 
this important point. 
Also, the assessment of the regulatory framework 
lacks consideration of the Renewable Energy Direc-
tive 2009/28/EC. One could consider including re-
cent European Commission proposals, e.g. the Infra-
structure Package, as well. 
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Annex 7: Conclusions of Public Consulta-
tion (based on report version “V2”, Nov. 
2011)20
Background
First and foremost, the report must recall that, so 
far, an off-shore grid and the associated wind farms 
are not developed based on pure, free market crite-
ria: they involve subsidies and site choices which are 
proposed by national public authorities. In the end, 
a connection between a wind farm and the on-shore 
grid is therefore paid for with the help of subsidies. 
As long as subsidy schemes across Europe are not 
harmonized, there is no need for a European-wide 
guideline to connect an off-shore grid project.
Secondly, only TSOs are allowed collecting income 
from interconnectors according to the European 
legislation (EC Regulation 714/2009). Therefore, 
planning and operation of off-shore grids remain by 
definition a TSO task. The design of off-shore grids 
should involve socio-economic criteria in order to 
avoid underinvestment in grid expansions. This ex-
clude generators; they do not have the right incen-
tives to ensure a socio-economic efficient expansion 
of interconnectors and off-shore grids.
Thirdly, competition in the construction of off-shore 
grids is based on tendering processes. Assuming that 
the design of off-shore grids is performed according 
to  socio-economic optima, and that the construction 
phase performed cost efficiently using a tender pro-
cess, European TSOs are then able to design and op-
erate any off-shore grid project in a way that ensures a 
socio-economic benefit from off-shore grid projects.  
Fourthly, the location of off-shore wind farms is 
based on governmental analysis and TSO planning, 
20. With written comments either in the initial drat report or in 
a specific paper coming  from Commillas, E3G, Energinet, Eu-
ropacable, EWEA and RWE
since the need to disperse wind farms geographi-
cally within a country comes from the necessity of 
balancing wind power production.   The planning of 
off-shore grids connected to wind farms should be 
addressed centrally in order to ensure coordination 
with any other grid development projects. The loca-
tion of off-shore grids, closely linked with the loca-
tion of off-shore wind farms, should be addressed 
centrally in order to ensure that the overall onshore 
grid is capable of transporting power flows from the 
off-shore grid.  In the end, off-shore grids will become 
an integral part of the European transmission grid, 
going beyond the use of national regulations for own-
ership, cost allocation, construction and operations. 
Last but not least, off-shore grid will require very 
sophisticated control techniques, since operated as 
a meshed network, and of course assuming that the 
chosen grid architectures are in the end controllable. 
The safe operations of the meshed off-shore HVDC 
lies then require DC HV switchgears, bearing in mind 
that grid failure problems in DC grids have an impact 
on the whole grid, even if such breakers are imple-
mented in the DC part of the grid. Such a technology 
is yet to be demonstrated at full scale, together with 
the introduction of more sophisticated coordination 
tools between TSOs. 
Technology availability
There is evidence that technology uncertainty feeds 
into higher investments costs for grids. Yet, more 
emphasis should be given on the impact of future 
electricity demand upon the speed of technological 
development, since technology manufacturers21 very 
often claim that they can deliver appropriate solutions 
if they are confident about future orders.  This is why 
early system demonstrations are of use to anticipate 
on validation steps which precedes early commer-
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cial deployment.  The report recommendations for 
competitive tenders prior to demonstration projects 
should be accompanied with higher priority stings 
for offshore grid projects within the proposed regula-
tion on infrastructure priorities (and associated sup-
port from the Connecting Europe Facility).
Moreover off-shore grid will require very sophisti-
cated control techniques, since operated as a meshed 
network. It requires DC HV switchgears, bearing in 
mind that grid failure problems in DC grids have an 
impact on the whole grid without such breakers.
Harmonization issues
The complete harmonisation of either connection re-
gimes or renewable support mechanisms may, on pa-
per, appear to be the most efficient solution to many 
of the identified problems. Yet, recent evidence shows 
that proposals for full harmonisation of policies are 
inevitably politically contentious, requiring consider-
able more time and efforts to succeed.  Political un-
certainty on regulatory regimes will then inevitably 
impact investment processes. It is to manage this risk 
that “second best” solutions which may be more eas-
ily achieved should be addressed and implemented, 
alongside the parallel process in charge of reaching 
recommendations on harmonisation.
Locational signals and connection charges
Even though locational signals for offshore genera-
tion (offshore generators paying for their connec-
tion, while being protected from the risk of poor grid 
availability) may lead to market efficiencies, there is 
a significant risk that poorly-designed locational sig-
nals could undermine or distort offshore wind de-
velopment rather than making it more efficient (for 
instance, placing too much of the cost and risk bur-
den on early investors when new sectors for offshore 
wind open up).  Future emphasis should be put upon 
the potential risks of poorly-designed charging ar-
rangements, whereas alternative mechanisms could 
be analysed to ensure offshore wind development in 
clusters or hubs (e.g. licensing and maritime spatial 
planning arrangements).
Uncertainty and risk management for off-shore 
grid development
The THINK report addresses many of the uncertain-
ties that will prevail in the development of off-shore 
grids. Yet, more emphasis ought to be put on the re-
lated risk management issues. It is not only a question 
of avoiding stranded assets: further consideration 
should be put on how investments open up or close 
down future energy system options in the context of 
decarbonisation. Such options must be valued when 
developing the appropriate regulatory regimes which 
will be designed to favour anticipatory investments. 
Towards timely investments in off-shore grids
There is technology and economic evidence that off 
shore wind development will heavily rely on VSC-
HVDC technologies. This is not yet an “off-the-shelf ” 
technology. There is a need to start the construction 
of off-shore grids very early in order to meet high 
level political goals. This means that, most probably, 
consumers will have to carry the burden of a larger 
stranding risk in order to benefit from a long term 
greener future. Ideally, TSOs should then be pushed 
by regulation to make a predictive, holistic plan-
ning: when audited by a well-informed regulator, this 
should result in a leaner, faster and more efficient 




EWEA response to public consultation of “Offshore grids: towards a least regret EU policy” 
report 
 
EWEA welcomes the report “Offshore grids: towards a least regret EU policy” prepared by the 
THINK Consortium. Given the ambitious EU targets on renewable energy penetration, GHG 
emissions reduction and the creation of a single electricity market, EWEA sees this report as 
an important assessment of the current regulatory framework for this technology that 
provides sound policy recommendations for DG Energy.  
 
EWEA believes that wind power is a key enabler for the accomplishment of EU targets. In this 
sense, we see electricity infrastructure development as a prerequisite of successful market 
integration. For offshore wind power, this is more evident as infrastructure has to be built 
from scratch. EWEA believes this represents an opportunity for policy makers to act 
proactively in shaping the development of a transnational offshore grid to maximise its 
benefits and we broadly subscribe to the report’s recommendations. 
 
EWEA considers that the OffshoreGrid project has demonstrated the techno-economic 
benefits of integrated offshore grid solutions over individual developments. We recognise that 
there are several visions on how offshore grids could develop. Consequently we agree with the 
recommendation that greater political coordination is required in the development of a 
common vision.   
 
We also agree that some questions require a European approach, while others can be better 
answered at national, bilateral or regional level. Nevertheless, these must be coordinated in 
order to converge in the achievement of the objectives that the EU and MS have subscribed 
to. A clear stable policy, regulatory and market framework is required in which division of 
responsibilities and accountability are clarified.  
 
Specifically with regards to the recommendations on farm-to-shore and shore-to-shore 
connections, EWEA broadly agrees that regulatory and economic issues need to be tackled for 
onshore and offshore projects as a whole. No intervention at EU-level is required for specific 
offshore projects of this type, but solutions should be assessed with common cost-benefit 
methodology for allocation of costs with cross-border impacts. 
 
EWEA agrees that developing combined offshore grid solutions requires a more regional 
coordination approach for planning, connection regimes and support mechanisms. 
 
EWEA has repetitively called for offshore grids planning as a high-level priority in the 
development of EU electricity infrastructure. Therefore, EWEA has welcomed that the EC has 
highlighted the Northern Seas Offshore Grid as a priority corridor in the recent Infrastructure 
Package published on 19 October 2011. EWEA believes this is the first step to facilitate 
coordinated and therefore more cost-effective connection regimes and encourage the 
development of a common vision as per THINK’s recommendations. Offshore grids 
subsequently have to be reflected in ENTSO-E development plans, in particular in the 




On the other hand, support for offshore wind energy should be made compatible with 
combined solutions, the OffshoreGrid report highlights, however, that to achieve this goal it is 
not necessary to harmonise European support schemes, but to make them compatible with 
one another. In this sense, we do not agree with THINK’s recommendation for harmonisation 
of offshore support schemes. We believe that when benefits from an international 
interconnection are present, bilateral arrangements, adaptations or exemptions to the 
national support schemes should be examined first. 
 
Finally, EWEA agrees that it is absolutely necessary to maintain technology development and 
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ENTSO-E response to the public consultation on the THINK-report 
Topic 5: Offshore Grids towards a least regret policy  
.
1. General Comments
ENTSO-E welcomes the opportunity to comment on the THINK-report “Offshore Grids: towards a least regret policy”.  
The report covers a number of important areas in which ENTSO-E and our members are currently involved.  As such, 
we are pleased to provide our views on the issues raised by the report.  Comments on the document have been 
provided from a TSO expert perspective and any views expressed should not be considered as a formal ENTSO-E 
position.   
At the outset we would like to stress that it is imperative for Europe’s TSOs to be at the heart of the design, 
ownership and operation of transmission networks – be they on- or offshore (indeed we would counsel against 
considering offshore grids in isolation).  Developing the transmission infrastructure which Europe needs to achieve 
challenging and legally binding targets for renewable connections, while ensuring security of supply and ensuring 
competitive prices, in our view, requires holistic and joined up solutions which only TSOs are capable of providing. 
We note that many of the issues raised in the document have much in common with issues raised by the report on 
transmission tariffs under THINK topic 6.  We have responded to that document separately and our responses should 
be read in parallel.  ENTSO-E looks forward to continuing to play a leading role in discussions on this topic and would 
be pleased to provide additional information if it would prove useful. 
2. Farm to shore standalone lines
 
Who decides and who pays  
 
In respect of farm to shore lines, the report distinguishes between “who decides” and “who pays”.  Regarding, the 
question of who decides, it asks whether connections should respond to generator demands for capacity or whether 
some sort of anticipatory approach should be taken by TSOs.  ENTSO-E notes the following: 
o Offshore and onshore reinforcements cannot be considered in isolation and the TSO needs to be the party 
identifying the optimal design for the on- and offshore system. 
o Making investments ahead of a clearly signalled demand for capacity may create stranded asset risk (i.e. if 
the generator fails to connect).  This risk can be taken by TSOs or customers.  Passing the risk to TSOs 
could prove counterproductive by increasing risk, and hence required return, across the entire asset base. 
Similarly passing the risk to customers can raise questions of fairness. However, investment clearly needs 
to be made in a timely manner – which is dependent on effective regulation and streamlined permitting 
processes – and we consider that regulators and TSOs need to work together to ensure projects are 
  
 
delivered in a timely manner. There may therefore be a case for incentives which reward timely delivery of 
infrastructure (and the earlier receipts of the benefits of investment by customers).  
In respect of who pays, ENTSO-E notes: 
o As noted in our response to the THINK report on tariffs, we support cost-reflective charges for generators, 
so that the costs of transmission may be considered in decision making  
o However, while connection costs pass all the stranded asset risk to generators, they can create barriers to 
entry and first mover advantages, hindering effective competition.  Hence the full consequences of such an 
approach would require careful consideration and we are not convinced that either a fully deep or super 
shallow approach would be appropriate.   
o We do not consider that there are objective reasons to differentiate the approach to charging different types 
of generation. 
Fine tuning regulatory approaches  
We are not convinced that the distinction between offshore and onshore projects is entirely appropriate.  In our view, 
there are differences between investment in meshed networks (network deepening investments) and extensions to 
the network (network expansion investments).  The fact that the line is offshore may imply some additional 
technology risks, though these risks may also exist with onshore projects, such as very high voltage “overlay grid” 
style developments. However, we agree that the characteristics of offshore projects (and network deepening 
investments more generally) require focused amendments to regulatory frameworks.  
Aside from ensuring that risks are reflected in returns (which we discuss in more detail in the context of cross border 
projects below) and that investors can be attracted to offshore projects, we consider that elements of regulatory 
regimes may also need to be updated.  Taking steps to adapt transmission charging methodologies and partially 
reflecting network costs in the charges paid to generators may be beneficial.   
Europe is facing a significant need for investment in both generation and transmission capacity. It is important that 
the overall cost of this investment is minimized and that efficient decisions are made. From a theoretical viewpoint, 
EU wide locational signals for generators could incentivize investors to consider the impact of an investment on the 
overall transmission grid. Despite this potential advantage the efforts necessary to design and implement this 
approach should not be underestimated, and relationships to the location incentive effects of congestion 
management would need to be considered carefully.  
Similarly, we consider that taking steps to remove distortions and supports through regulatory regimes may promote 
more efficient decision making. It will also be important to recognize that, in some cases and at some point in future, 
farm to shore connections may be extended to become parts of more meshed solutions.  National regulatory regimes 
need to be capable of dealing with this situation and, as discussed below, in such cases differences between 
approaches are likely to have more substantial consequences for the efficient functioning of the European electricity 
market and therefore may need to be proactively addressed.  
  
 
3. Shore to shore standalone lines 
 
As the report rightly notes, the development of additional cross border capacity is fundamental to completing the 
internal electricity market and hence promoting the development and delivery of these projects is of particular 
importance. We consider the following points: 
o How to ensure efficient planning 
o How to ensure regulatory regimes promote the delivery of such projects. 
o The parties which should be responsible for the delivery of the projects.  
o Issues around cost allocation.  
Efficient planning 
ENTSO-E agrees that there is a need to generate information on future offshore developments and a need to plan in 
a coordinated manner.  The ENTSO-E Ten Year Network Development Plan, of which the next release is planned for 
2012, will be an important vehicle for identifying required offshore investments.  In addition, ENTSO-E has made a 
proposal to the European Commission to develop a Modular Development Plan of the Electricity Highways System 
that will consider all timeframes until 2050.   
We also note that efficient system planning is dependent on reliable information.  We support attempts to improve the 
quality of information by, for example, requiring proportionate financial contributions from generators or using 
windows to identify the amounts of capacity to be connected in a given geographic area in order to optimize designs.  
Financing and promoting investment 
In ENTSO-E’s view it is imperative that regulatory regimes do not create disincentives to invest (either nationally or in 
cross border projects) and are calibrated to focus on the delivery of the outputs which European customers’ value 
and to maximize benefits to those customers.   In particular it must be recognized that TSOs compete for investors in 
a global market place.  We consider that creating the conditions to deliver significant volumes of new investment will 
need a re-think of the regulatory conditions which are applied to TSO’s (in particular a move away from a regulatory 
approach which focuses solely on cost reduction and tariff decreases to an approach which incentivizes efficient and 
timely investment) and a recognition, and reflection in returns offered by National Regulatory Authorities, of the risks 
incurred by TSO’s when planning and realizing these investments.  This is true both on- and offshore and is 
particularly the case for cross-border investments which are often perceived as carrying more risk and hence are less 
attractive to shareholders.   
In addition, we note the importance of Research and Development expenditure in ensuring that sufficient attention is 
paid to promoting long term innovation and we welcome proposals to speed up technology development. We also 
agree that encouraging the development of standards to ensure interoperability between the HVDC components and 




Responsibility for delivery 
In ENTSO-E’s view, TSOs are the appropriate party to identify a need for cross border investment (and the 
associated onshore reinforcements that are inevitably also required) and the appropriate party to deliver, own and 
operate that investment.  TSOs are able to take a system wide view and make optimal investments which enhance 
overall social welfare – leading to significant overall cost savings. This avoids the necessity which merchant 
interconnector projects face to undersize connections in order to maintain the price difference that makes the project 
viable and is likely to lead to far more efficient overall solutions.  There is a strong track record of successful 
collaboration between TSOs in developing interconnection projects (and elsewhere) and, in our view, the incremental 
development of an offshore grid is far more likely to occur under such an approach.   
We note that the report proposes competition where possible.  We note that TSOs already face strong regulatory 
incentives to minimize costs (and to demonstrate they have done so) and, in most cases, hold their own tenders for 
equipment supplies etc (i.e. competition is internalized). We also note that TSOs have considerable experience of 
negotiating with suppliers which, in highly concentrated markets (such as the market for subsea cables) is of 
particular importance and can hinder effective competition.  We also note that the introduction of competitive regimes 
can be a time consuming process (circa 9 years in Great Britain) and, at a time when there is a pressing need for 
investment, we do not consider that such an approach would be proportionate.  
Cost allocation 
In respect of cost allocation, we would counsel against seeking to apply a ‘one size fits all’ approach and consider 
that bilateral/regional negotiation will always have a role to play in finding appropriate solutions. That said, we 
consider that cost benefit analysis to identify the overall benefit of a project and, perhaps, the expected beneficiaries, 
could prove a useful first step in this process.  
4. Concluding remarks  
ENTSO-E hopes that the views contained in this report are useful.  We would be pleased to discuss any aspect of 
the response.  We note that ENTSO-E and our member TSOs are closely involved in work in many of the areas 
raised within the report and we look forward to continuing to contribute positively as work in each area develops.  
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